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INTRODUCTION 
The legal treatment of compilations, including electronic 
collections of factual information, presents problems for copyright 
law.  The tests employed in determining subsistence of copyright, 
whether framed as a creativity-based standard, arising from the 
investment of labor, skill or judgment in either collection or 
presentation of contents, or some combination thereof, are 
notoriously difficult to apply.  There is also risk of independent 
proprietary protection inadvertently extending to the contents of 
such compilations that are given copyright protection.  
Notwithstanding the complex nature of the problems, and a 
dispiriting lack of momentum towards harmonized legal treatment 
of databases at the international level,1 the protection of databases 
is very much on the agenda in the revision of the Canadian 
Copyright Act2 and difficult decisions will soon have to be made. 
There are three main problems that lawmakers face when 
revising present protections.  First, although the public policy 
justification for protection is an intrinsically economic one, there is 
little in the way of empirical economic analysis to aid in 
considering the effect of existing or revised legal models on new 
 
1 Notwithstanding the adoption of the status quo in article 5 of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty [WCT], the protection of databases is 
still a matter being discussed by the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and 
Related Rights [SCCR] and was last discussed at the 7th session in May, 2002. See 
Report: Seventh Session, Geneva, May 13 to 17, 2002, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/10 (May 31, 
2002), available at http://www.wipo.org/news/en/index.html?wipo_content_frame=/ 
news/en/documents.html.  The proposal still at the heart of the discussions is the Basic 
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect 
to Databases, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (1996).  One study submitted during the 7th 
session considering the economic implications of database protection primarily in 
developing countries encouraged protection from an economic perspective, but was 
largely narrative and offered no new empirical analysis. See Yale M. Braunstein, 
Economic Impact of Database Protection in Developing Countries and Countries in 
Transition, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/2 (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www.wipo.org/ 
news/en/index.html?wipo_content_frame=/news/en/documents.html. Database protection 
remains on the SCCR agenda for continuing consideration. 
2 The protection of databases is expressly within the Canadian governments plans for 
copyright reform. See A Framework for Copyright Reform, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/ 
SSG/rp01101e.html. 
2-FREEDMAN FORMAT 12/12/02 1:03 PM 
2002] SHOULD CANADA ENACT A NEW DATABASE RIGHT? 37 
and emerging industries.  Determining the level and scope of 
optimal protection through the dominant economic incentive 
paradigm becomes a very uncertain business.  Second, the 
implications of maintaining proprietary interests in such 
collections may yield unwanted secondary effects and result in 
over-containment of data, with negative implications for access to 
data and markets alike.  Recent studies indicate that this effect is of 
particular concern regarding data used in scientific research.  
Third, while sui generis rights in such subject matter may avoid the 
imperfections of an overly robust proprietary approach, such a 
model may require a greater explicit acceptance of unfair 
competition doctrine than has previously been the case. 
As a threshold matter, databases are subject matter worthy of 
protection and, further, revision of the status quo is desirable.  The 
present regime makes available an uncertain degree of protection 
through copyright law.  It features high administrative and 
transaction costs in non-optimized security expenditures in the 
form of technological mechanisms and legal costs, risks over-
containment through overly restrictive contractual arrangements 
that must be litigated elsewhere where dominant market positions 
are abused, and allows for obscured judicial policymaking in 
determining questions of subsistence of copyright.  A revised 
regime should aim to take better account of the economic 
implications of protection, but avoid any temptation to import 
economic considerations directly into legal models (obviating the 
need to turn judges into economists for the purposes of doctrinal 
development); be more transparent in its construction and 
development of policy; allow for socially desirable access that is 
not market-driven; be constructed with a view to international 
harmonization; and be sensitive to Canadian legal traditions.  This 
author is aware that it may seem somewhat awkward to advocate a 
nationalist agenda within a paper that considers the utility of 
comparative sources and experience, but Canadian policymakers 
should take care not to allow the questions for decision to be 
framed in terms of the policy preferences that dominate elsewhere, 
particularly in respect to American conceptions of fair use rights. 
It is suggested that Canadian lawmakers should have close 
regard for the recent European experience in the protection of both 
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original and unoriginal databases under the EU Database Directive, 
3 which makes available both a copyright in databases and a non-
proprietary sui generis database right.  Though developed in 
Europe in a somewhat haphazard way, and implemented 
problematically, the idea of a two-tiered system seems an attractive 
one.  Such an approach has the capacity to differentiate between 
compilations that are truly the result of a principled view of 
authorship and worthy of full copyright and accompanying moral 
rights, and compilations that are less worthy but still protectable 
based on the sufficiency of the investment of labor and resources 
expended in their creation (much as is done in present 
circumstances through pragmatic constructions of originality in 
determining subsistence of copyright).  Provided that these sui 
generis rights are carefully balanced with appropriate public 
interest permissions and defenses (and perhaps subject to 
mandatory licensing provisions in respect to single-source data as 
well), this article suggests that a suitable two-tiered regime could 
be a desirable way both to better protect databases in Canada, and, 
perhaps of equal utility, to reawaken presently dormant 
negotiations towards internationally harmonized treatment through 
a Database Treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) on the same basis. 
I. OF PROTECTION AND ACCESS: DESCRIBING THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST JUSTIFYING PROTECTION OF DATABASES 
It is as mothers milk for intellectual property lawyers to accept 
that perpetual intellectual property protection does not yield new 
stores of intellectual property perpetually any more than does more 
intellectual property law result in more intellectual property 
(though it probably does ensure more intellectual property 
lawyers).  Protections must be balanced against other important 
interests not all of which are economic in character, 
notwithstanding that the dominant reason for protection may be an 
economic one.  This section briefly sets out the nature of the public 
policy interests that justify protection of databases. 
 
3 Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. 
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The subject matter at issue here is sometimes referred to using 
the various terms of art that dominate in a given intellectual 
property law system (e.g., compilations, tables, or catalogues), but 
should be treated generically when considering the public interest 
in legal protection.  For the purposes of this discussion, it may be 
easiest to refer to the generalized definition of databases as set out 
in the EU Database Directive: collections of independent works, 
data or other materials which are systematically or methodically 
arranged and can be individually accessed.4  Databases, then, 
need not be digitized works in electronic form, the modern 
association, but may include traditional paper-based collections of 
information.  Though creative collections like anthologies of 
poetry would fit within this discussion as much as a collection of 
telephone numbers, the market is more interested in the latter.  
Through the use of innovative information technology, it is now 
possible to gather together, in one comprehensive work, a 
collection of data verified as accurate on a given subject.  Business 
people recognize the commercial utility of such information 
resources, and estimates put the global database industry at tens of 
billions of dollars per year.5  These collections of facts may be 
expensive to create, expensive to verify as accurate, expensive to 
maintain as comprehensive, and, not surprisingly, expensive to 
gain access to by consumers.  Quite obviously, then, there is a 
strong national interest in encouraging the creation of new wealth 
in the form of such intellectual property, as well as facilitating its 
trade and accessibility to foster commercial interests within 
modern information-oriented economies.  The utility of databases 
is thus an economic one, although these economic interests have to 
be balanced against the greater public interest in fostering specific 
uses that are socially significantin other words, the basic 
 
4 Id. para. 17.  Whether this is a desirable definition for the purposes of defining 
doctrine is another matter. 
5 See Statutory Protection for Databases: Economic & Public Policy Issues: Hearing 
on H.R. 2652 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Laura D. Tyson & Edward F. 
Sherry, Members, Info. Indus. Assn), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/ 
41118.htm. 
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economic paradigm underlying much of intellectual property law 
generally.6 
A. The Dominant Consideration: Economics of Databases 
With apologies to the well versed, and proceeding from the 
proposition that the public interest in this sort of utilitarian subject 
matter is intrinsically but not exclusively an economic one, it is 
helpful to begin by restating in broad terms the classical economic 
incentive paradigm.  Intellectual property, or information goods 
as the economic literature would prefer, is generally more valuable 
when in the hands of consumers than producers.  Thus, the goal of 
policymakers is to construct and maintain a system that enables 
such goods to be traded successfully in the market.  Trading these 
goods allows producers to recoup investment, and competition 
between rivals leads to an optimally efficient market.7  In such an 
optimal market, supply and demand reach an equilibrium price 
which alone drives production such that an optimal number of 
information goods are created using an optimal amount of the 
finite resources that may be made available for such purposes.8  In 
such optimal conditions, the market is self-regulating and there is 
no need for regulatory intervention.9 
The difficulty faced by those dealing with information goods is 
primarily attributable to their intangible nature.10  The distribution 
and consumption of such goods does not diminish their availability 
and does not result in scarcity; they are non-excludable (once the 
good is produced, producers cannot exclude others from being 
benefited by it) with non-rival (there is no cost incurred in 
producing an additional good).11  This public goods character of 
 
6 See generally Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962), reprinted in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (Peter Drahos ed., 1999) (presenting a classic formulation). 
7 See id. at 610. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, in PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS (1989), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL & 
INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 17, 19 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997). 
11 See id. at 1920.  Thomas Jeffersons analogy to lighting one candle from the flame 
of another is widely referred to in the literature: Its peculiar character, too, is that no one 
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intellectual property results in a situation where the fixed cost of 
independent creation tends to be very high, but the cost of 
reproduction and distribution tends to be very lowthus providing 
a strong incentive for rivals to free ride on the producers 
investment of resources rather than invest independent resources to 
create these same goods or pay license fees.12  Where the good is 
appropriated without payment by such a free rider and a copy is 
made available for sale, the original producer of the good faces 
competition in which the rivals sale price reflects only the 
marginal costs of reproduction.13  If the producer must lower her 
price to compete with the free rider, the producer will not be able 
to recoup the investment in production.14  If the producer doesnt 
lower her price, she recoups none of the investment and any 
incentive to produce evaporates.15  This causes market failure.  
Thus, the allowance of free riding is highly undesirable as it 
disturbs the self-regulating market preventing optimal efficiency 
from being achieved. 
The ease by which information goods can be appropriated by a 
rival gives rise to two welfare losses: underproduction (through 
lack of sufficient market pressure) and underutilization (where the 
price charged is not sufficiently attractive to consumers).16  These 
effects can be addressed through regulation, either in the form of 
direct or indirect subsidy17 (thus lowering the producers fixed 
costs and transferring the cost of free-riding to consumers as a 
 
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it.  He who receives an 
idea from me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his 
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333
34 (Thomas Jefferson Meml Assn ed., 1905), cited in SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, 
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 24 (2001). 
12 See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
292 (1996). 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. at 29394. 
16 See id. at 293. 
17 Some economists advocate subsidy systems. See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van 
Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). 
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whole) or through the legal enforcement of a temporary monopoly 
in the form of property rights.18 
Monopolies (created through property rights) give the producer 
the power to charge a supra-market price and to slow the 
dissemination of these goods in the market.19  The strength of the 
right is important as the fixed costs of potential entrants into the 
market are affected, the more the potential rival can borrow from 
the producer without payment, the lower the costs of production, as 
licensing costs, independent research, and other transaction costs 
are saved.20  The danger, then, is that while trying to diminish the 
social welfare loss due to underproduction, the welfare loss due to 
underutilization is increased.21  The content and features of the 
created right then become crucial.  The duration of the right (its 
length), the subject matter that it encompasses (the depth of the 
copyright), and the nature of what acts are considered infringing 
(the breadth of the right) are all significant.  In determining the 
content of the right and its overall strength, there is a need to 
balance the desire to maintain an adequate incentive to create 
information goods (favoring a high degree of protection) and the 
full availability of such goods to those in the market that are 
willing to pay at least the costs of production (favoring a low 
degree of protection).22  According to Posner and Landes, the most 
important implications of this welfare model in relation to 
copyright works are that the optimal amount of protection is higher 
for classes of subject matter that are more valuable socially, and 
that increasing copyright above the optimal level leads to the 
 
18 See Netanel, supra note 12, at 293. 
19 See id.  This description is admittedly crudely drawn.  This Article does not include, 
for example, consideration of price discrimination to mitigate against the negative effects 
of deadweight loss.  These issues are covered admirably elsewhere. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Putnam, Copyright and the New Economy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION 
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Jonathan Putnam ed., forthcoming 2002); Wendy 
J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998). 
20 See Netanel, supra note 12, at 293. 
21 Constanze Thönebe, The Legal Protection of Databases in EuropeAn Economic 
Analysis 14 (2000) (unpublished dissertation, Université Aix-Marseille III). 
22 See Netanel, supra note 12, at 293. 
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production of more works but with lower welfare per work.23  
This, then, presents the fundamental dilemma for policymakers in 
structuring legal rules to achieve more efficient market conditions: 
without a legal monopoly, too little information will be produced; 
but with a legal monopoly, too little information will be used.24 
Databases, in contrast, rely primarily on their 
comprehensiveness and accuracy to make them attractive in the 
market.25  The costs of production generally fall to gathering, 
maintaining, and verifying information, as well as presenting it in a 
suitable format with appropriate user-friendly tools.  One would be 
less willing to use a database without some degree of confidence 
that the contents are accurate as of the date of use, regardless of 
product qualities such as an electronic search facilitys ease of use.  
Thus, the degree to which databases are updated and their contents 
verified as accurate is vital.26  Indeed, this is an important issue 
that the economic model must grapple with: Can legal protection 
provide an adequate incentive for producers to update their works, 
while tailoring the right to avoid updating that is not socially 
useful?  Crucial in the incentive structure is the term of the right 
and the conditions that must be satisfied in order to continue or 
reacquire the right. 
B. Balancing Protection of Databases: The Public Interest in 
Access to Data 
No matter how one frames the issue,27 ultimately the public 
interest is in balancing protection with those uses that are so 
 
23 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 34344 (1989). 
24 See id. 
25 Christian Koboldt, The EU Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the 
Incentives to Update: An Economic Analysis, 17 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 127, 131 (1997). 
26 See id. at 131. 
27 One may frame the issue in terms of the idea-expression dichotomy, but, as the 
English courts note, it all depends on what you mean by an idea and it may be best to 
avoid these types of aphorisms altogether, see L.B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Prods. Ltd., 
1979 R.P.C. 551, 629 (H.L.); or what is a work, see Ibcos Computers Ltd. v. Barclays 
Mercantile Highland Fin. Ltd., 1994 F.S.R. 275 (Ch.); or a concern for the public domain, 
see David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 
(1981); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
WIRED WORLD (2001); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
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socially significant that the law must permit them over the 
presumptive objections of the rights-holder.  Although it may be 
desirable to encourage investment in databases because they 
represent new sources of wealth and new resources for wealth-
creation, it is equally desirable that both the underlying data as 
well as the database itself remain accessible; otherwise, the rights-
grant may not be sufficiently favorable to justify its recognition. 
Professor Paul David takes the position that the present 
international regime of ever-strengthening copyright protection, 
and specifically the copyright protection of databases, threatens to 
retard progress.28  Moreover, he argues, increased rights in 
information technology present a range of access issues that have 
largely been smothered in the public consciousness by the more 
emotive issue of intellectual property rights in genetic material.29  
Of crucial importance to David are threats to scientific research 
and the institutional infrastructure of open collaboration in such 
research.30  These concerns have been addressed elsewhere, 
including extensive literature by Maurer31 and others32 that has led 
 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 
(1999); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661 (1999); Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); or through slogans like 
information wants to be free, see STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE 
FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987); or based on the position that the digital context makes legal 
protections redundant and attempts to enforce legal regimes that are wasteful and wrong 
when we should be creating new systems, see John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: 
Selling Wine Without Bottles on the Global Net, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, 
LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997), available at 
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/EconomyOfIdeas.html. 
28 See Paul A. David, A Tragedy of the Public Knowledge Commons? Global Science, 
Intellectual Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang (2000), at 
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0400.pdf (last modified Sept. 10, 2000). 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See Stephen M. Maurer, Raw Knowledge: Protecting Technical Databases for 
Science & Industry, in COMM. FOR A STUDY ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST COMMN ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, 
MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS, NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS app. C at 33776 (1999). 
32 See Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Database Protection: Is it Broken 
and Should We Fix It?, 284 SCI. 1129 (1999); Stephen M. Maurer et al., Europes 
Database Experiment, 294 SCI. 789 (2001) [hereinafter Maurer et al., Europes Database 
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to criticism of extended database protection in Canada on this and 
other bases.33  While acknowledging the appropriation problem 
tending to market failure, David criticizes an over-dependency on 
proprietary protections: 
The problem is not so much intellectual property rights 
mechanism itself, which although imperfect, has been 
found to work well enough when it comes to stimulating 
private investment in the exploitation of commercial 
opportunities based upon existing bodies of scientific and 
engineering knowledge.  What is more problematic for the 
long run, however, is that an unchecked bias towards 
expanding of the domain of information goods within 
which private property institutions and market mechanisms 
flourish, is steadily encroaching upon the domain of public 
information.  In doing so, it has tended to weaken, and may 
in the end seriously undermine those non-market 
institutions which historically have proved themselves to be 
especially effective in sustaining rapid growth in the 
scientific and technological knowledge base that is 
available to be exploited.34 
David goes on to argue that the availability of a communications 
infrastructure that allows for the sharing and efficient searching of 
relevant information will go unexploited, with negative effects for 
both the organization and funding of research projects in the future 
(especially since government subsidies to scientists have been 
reduced in recent years).35  All of this leads to the digital 
dilemma, the resolution of which has, thus far, favored producers 
at the expense of the public domain: 
As a consequence of the construction of novel and 
potentially legal rights in intellectual property, and the 
encouragement of public and quasi-public institutions in 
 
Experiment]; Stephen M. Maurer et al., Sciences Neglected Legacy, 405 NATURE 117 
(2000) [hereinafter Maurer et al., Sciences Neglected Legacy]. 
33 See Suzanne A. Scotchmer & Stephen M. Maurer, Across Two Worlds: Database 
Protection in the US and Europe, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Jonathan Putnam ed., forthcoming 2002). 
34 David, supra note 28, at 3. 
35 See id. at 5, 16. 
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making use of these to attract private sector funding as a 
way of meeting the high first-costs of making digitized 
archives available on electronic networks, larger and larger 
portions of the public data commons are being 
enclosed and transformed into private monopolies.36 
David is not alone in raising these concerns.  The question of 
the impact of database protection on scientific research was one of 
the matters that was the subject of inquiries by WIPO during the 
failed attempt to create a Database Treaty, and a range of 
respondents indicated their concern that the need to ensure the free 
circulation of data in the interest of scientific research be 
maintained in any protection system.37  The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
observed: 
Databases financed with public funds, whose purpose is the 
efficient accomplishment of public-interest missions (at 
both the national and the international level), cover a 
variety of very extensive fields.  UNESCO and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMM), for instance, 
produce this kind of database in connection with subjects 
like earth sciences, the environment, ecology, water, 
oceanography or space . . . .  The rules that will govern 
exchanges involving this type of database and databases 
produced for commercial purposes should not, therefore, be 
derived from the logic of competitive exploitation which is 
a feature of commerce.  For the scientific community, the 
public-interest mission underlying the raison dêtre of 
databases produced by public institutions is sufficient in 
itself to make people acknowledge that their producers 
should be allowed free and full access, on a non-
discriminatory basis, to all sources of data (in whatever 
 
36 Id. at 7. 
37 See Intl Bureau, WIPO, Information Meeting on Intellectual Property in Databases, 
WIPO Doc. DB/IM/4 (Sept. 4, 1997) (including an analytic table of questions raised upon 
which consultation was sought), available at http://www.wipo.org/eng/meetings 
/infdat97/pdf/db_im_4.pdf; Report, WIPO Doc. DB/IM/6 (Sept. 19, 1997), available at 
http://www.wipo.org/eng/meetings/infdat97/pdf/db_im_6.pdf. 
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form) that might be useful for updating the databases and 
improving their performance.38 
The resolution of this issue is a difficult one once proprietary 
entitlements enter the picture.  Some argue that the best solution is 
extra-legal in the sense of voluntary agreements to enforce rights 
only against certain uses or users.  Thus, Reichman and Uhlir have 
recently presented a working paper with the outlines of a top-down 
voluntary system (a dynamic e-commons), similar to Stallmans 
GNU open-source license scheme,39 which would essentially form 
a public interest cooperative of scientific researchers who are also 
rights-holders.40  This association of public-spirited scientists 
would license to industry but give free access to data for pure 
research purposes, all secured by contract.41  It would be 
administered by funding agencies, universities, and research bodies 
and would, it is suggested, benefit industry by providing more 
opportunities for commercialization of research.42  The underlying 
premise is to encourage pure science while recognizing the large 
financial support received by the scientific community, directly or 
indirectly, through public funds leading to commercial restrictions 
on developed data.43  It relies to an extent, as the authors 
acknowledge, on the formal inability of the American government 
to control public information through proprietary copyright 
protection, which places such information into the unprotectable 
public domain.44  The same is not true in Europe, Canada, or in the 
 
38 UNESCO, Observations, WIPO Doc. DB/IM/5 (Sept. 15, 1997), available at 
http://www.wipo.org/eng/meetings/infdat97/pdf/db_im_5.pdf. See also NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA 
(1997); Severine Dusollier et al., Copyright and Access to Information in the Digital 
Environment, 34 COPYRIGHT BULL. 4 (2000). 
39 See David McGowan, The Legal Implications of Open Source Software,  2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 241; Richard Stallman, Why Software Should Be Free, at 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html. 
40 See J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Promoting Public Good Uses of Scientific Data: 
A Contractually Reconstructed Commons for Science and Innovation (2001), at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/ReichmanandUhlir.pdf. 
41 See id.; J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: 
Recent Developments and their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 793 (1999). 
42 See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 40. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
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U.K. and, thus, the model may not be attractive as an international 
solution.45  In any case, it will be interesting to see both the final 
version of this proposal and the reaction of the academic research 
community. 
The question of access to scientific data is a very emotive 
issue.  Neither Maurer,46 David,47 nor UNESCO48 suggests that 
scientists who benefit from some form of public subsidy 
voluntarily eschew intellectual property rights in their inventions 
or other rights-bearing vehicles in the way that Reichman and 
Uhlir do.49  Some dissenting voices argue that the collaborative 
tradition might in fact immunize scientists against the rise of 
greater legal protections in databases.50  Dissenters also argue that 
the threat of databases monopoly pricing upon which scientists 
rely is exaggerated and market forces may supply correction.51  
These claims complicate matters for decision makers.  This author 
will resist the temptation to offer his own voice in support of one 
position or another to this vexing issue as he has presented the 
problem here as indicative of the need to balance access rights to 
data in crafting the legal treatment of databases, regardless of 
whether protections are framed as proprietary or liability models.  
However, this author believes that even this cursory review of the 
literature and the positions advanced by interested parties makes it 
clear that such questions of public interest exemptions from 
liability for scientific research cannot be determined through 
abstract questions of the public good by non-interested parties, no 
matter how well-meaning, and are complicated by the automatic 
entitlements that flow necessarily from a proprietary approach.  In 
practice, the reliance on proprietary protection, which is an all-or-
 
45 See id. 
46 See Maurer, supra note 31. 
47 See David, supra note 28. 
48 See UNESCO, supra note 38. 
49 See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 40. 
50 See, e.g., Michael Freno, Database Protection: Resolving the U.S. Database 
Dilemma with an Eye Toward International Protection, 34 CORNELL INTL L.J. 165, 190 
(2001). But see J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 115 (1997) (noting that the scientific community shares 
data in a way that would protect it from commercial data providers). 
51 See Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise, in THE 
CHANGING CHARACTER, USE AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3233 (1999). 
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nothing equation absent a specific permission or defense to cover 
the specific use, encourages the tendency to shape originality 
doctrine to produce a desired consequence.  This author suggests 
that a more meaningful approach would be one oriented to asking 
the more difficult questions (when to protect databases, on what 
basis, and to what degree), which does not fit well within an 
exclusively proprietary approach. 
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF DATABASES: CANADIAN AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 
Currently, in compliance with international agreements and 
established precedent, Canada protects databases through 
copyright law, which affords protection to compilations created by 
the selection and arrangement of literary, dramatic, musical, or 
artistic works (or parts of those works), and to the selection and 
arrangement of data as a literary work under the Copyright Act.52  
Revision of doctrine regarding the core criterion of originality in 
compilations in Canada has been on the horizon in recent years due 
to three significant developments: the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in 1991 to alter the construction of the originality 
standard under the American statute,53 Canadas accession to 
NAFTA in 1992,54 and the adoption of the Database Directive by 
the European Union in 1996.55  This section will examine the 
present Canadian copyright protection in the context of the 
 
52 Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42 (2001) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Copyright Act], 
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-42/text.html.  The Canadian Copyright Act was 
amended to comply with the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 
1705(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA], with respect to defining compilations 
through the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. See North 
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, ch. 44, § 53(3), 1993 S.C. (Can.), 
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/N-23.8/text.html.  The Canadian Copyright Act 
does preserve protection of tables as compilations, and in the past the two have been used 
as inter-changeable terms. See Tele-Direct (Publns) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info. Inc., [1998] 2 
F.C. 22 (Can. 1997); Chappell & Co. Ltd. v. Redwood Music Ltd., 2 All E.R. 817, 820, 
824 (H.L. 1980). 
53 See Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
54 Supra note 52. 
55 See supra note 3. 
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British56 and American approaches and evaluate the utility of a 
proprietary approach through the copyright law per se. 
It is useful to begin by recognizing that the debate over the 
appropriate treatment of databases through copyright is quite 
reflective of both the inherent tensions that arise in protecting such 
subject matter and the shifting nature of copyright law.  This is as 
true across jurisdictions as in the Canadian context.  The inhibition 
that the law places upon those wishing to use what some see as 
common cultural property requires a continuing reassessment of 
the justification of such intrusion.  Various approaches are 
commonly advanced and the arguments that are constructed are 
shaped by the legal systems and cultures in which they are 
rooted.57  Ultimately, dispassionate observers can only conclude 
that answers provided by such competing visions necessarily flow 
from the manner in which questions are framed, with unfortunate 
complications arising for policymakers charged with determining 
the public interest.  Indeed, that such complications arise in reality 
and not merely in theory is well borne out by the unfortunate 
division of the Supreme Court of Canada in the recent Theberge 
litigation.58  This inability to define a singular justification for 
copyright protection (and legal model arising therefrom, a 
universal theory of copyright as it were) is no bad thing.  To hold 
otherwise is to presume that such a singular approach is possible 
 
56 The pre-1998 British law is still relevant to the protection of computer programs. 
57 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT § 1.1 (2001).  Teleological 
approaches focus on the economic implications of legal protections for market efficiency 
and greater social welfare and proceed based on the desirability of forecasted 
consequences.  As one might expect, contemporary law and economics scholars have 
been influential in setting this policy agenda in recent years.  Deontological approaches, 
whether based on a Kantian concern for the creators of copyrighted works (an ethical 
reluctance to regard an author as a means to an end, rather than as an end in herself) or 
some Hegelian construction (the creators self-identity in a civil society is acknowledged 
by others through the property grant in the work that he has created), are creator-centered 
and tend to revolve around questions of duty and desert.  In copyright, one often finds 
these arguments arising when considering the nature of authorship.  These 
deontological arguments adapt easily to the access-concerned approach that rightly 
features on the Internet and in different communities, and fits neatly into much of the 
rights-theory scholarship in contemporary legal theory, as well as civilian droit dauteur 
traditions. 
58 Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 (Can.); 
see also infra notes 199, 201. 
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and desirable.  The goal of examining competing models is not to 
settle this ongoing debate, but to participate in it.  We should think 
of the law of copyright as a process to meet diverse aims, rather 
than the sole solution to a singular problem. 
Copyright doctrine in all three jurisdictions reviewed below
the United Kingdom,59 the United States,60 and Canada61reveals 
an uncertain and inconsistent level of protection of databases 
through artificial construction of the core question of originality, 
made worse at times by a liberal sprinkling of legal fiction.  
Perhaps of greater concern, the present proprietary models do not 
adequately speak to either the economic justification for protection 
of databases as copyrightable works; nor do they provide an 
adequate structure to balance competing interests regarding such 
works.  This uncertainty is quite undesirableit adds expense and 
encourages the use of informal protections which are as equally 
capable of over-constraining data as more formal models. 
A. The International Context 
The Berne Convention (hereinafter Berne) is the oldest of the 
international intellectual property treaties.62  It establishes the 
international treatment of copyright protection to give effect to the 
core principle of national treatment.63  The treaty seeks to maintain 
a system of protection that requires no formalities for copyright, 
and where the protection attaches independently of other legal 
treatment.64  Berne aims to establish a union of contracting states 
in which certain minimum protections are afforded and enforced 
for the protection of authors; it does not, however, dictate the 
manner in which signatories structure their own laws or the norms 
that feature in the national systems of contracting states.65  Berne, 
 
59 See infra Part III.B. 
60 See infra Part III.C. 
61 See infra Part III.D. 
62 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne].  Canada became a signatory 
to the Convention as a sovereign power in 1928, and to the latest revision on June 26, 
1998, though its law was in substantive compliance. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
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then, is neutral as to how states effectuate compliance (whether 
through enabling legislation or through self-execution), bearing in 
mind their own constitutional structures and legal cultures.66  The 
Berlin Revision added article 2(5) in 1909, which provides: 
Collections of literary and artistic works such as 
encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by virtue of the 
selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute 
intellectual creations, shall be protected as such, without 
prejudice to the copyright in each of the works forming part 
of such collections.67 
There are two points that bear examination: subject matter and 
subsistence.  In terms of definition, article 2(5) seems tied to 
collections of works that are themselves independently protectable 
as literary works, rather than mere data.68  It is not entirely clear 
whether this restriction is consistent with the earlier provisions of 
article 2, which cover the range of protectable subject matter, such 
that data may not be included subject to other requirements being 
fulfilled.69  There is no authoritative interpretation to settle the 
issue.  Second, the term intellectual creation is used in relation to 
collections specifically,70 and not regarding literary works in 
general under article 2(1),71 though it does seem to be implicit in 
the more generalized provisions.72  The natural question which 
arises, and which has featured prominently in the Canadian 
jurisprudence regarding similar provisions in NAFTA, is whether 
Berne intends a specific standard or whether this is a matter of 
national appreciation.  The phrase itself is not a matter of agreed-
upon guidelines within Berne.73  Professor Sam Ricketsons 
 
66 See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 18861986 at 13031 (1987); WILHELM NORDEMANN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAW 20 (R. Livingston trans., 
1990) (1977). 
67 Berne, supra note 62, art. 2(5). 
68 See id. 
69 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
82 (1998). 
70 See Berne, supra note 62, art. 2(5). 
71 See id. art. 2(1). 
72 See id. 
73 See Berne, supra note 62. 
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authoritative analysis is that Berne is a matter to be left to 
signatory states for implementation, notwithstanding that differing 
results might occur in the protection of factual compilations.74  
Ricketson concludes that the Berne Convention is cognizant of the 
common law approach to copyright that might accommodate unfair 
competition norms, despite its debasement of a purer concept of 
creativity-centered authorship.75 
As part of the general trend to international approximation, if 
not harmonization of laws, an augmented version of the Berne 
standard has been brought into both TRIPS, administered by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty in largely the same terms.76  These treaties incorporate and 
build upon the existing Berne standards, and in relation to 
databases, represent a codification of existing practice rather than 
creation of new norms,77 except in so far as they mandate the 
inclusion of compilations of data within the protection of literary 
works.78  While some argue that TRIPS departs from the general 
rule, leaving questions of originality to contracting states by tying 
a substantive standard to the selection and arrangement of data,79 
resolution of this issue is far from clear and this author would 
dispute the conclusion that it is now definitively settled. 
The important point in considering these various international 
and regional dimensions of intellectual property protection is to 
 
74 See RICKETSON, supra note 66, at 301; J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 
25455 (1998). 
75 See RICKETSON, supra note 66, at 901; Sam Ricketson, Reaping Without Sowing: 
Unfair Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo-Australian Law, 7 U. NEW 
S. WALES L.J. 1 (1984). 
76 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTSRESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 5, 36 
I.L.M. 65 (1997) (adopted in Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo033en.htm. 
77 See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 50 (1996). 
78 See Paul Katzenberger, TRIPS and Copyright Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPSTHE 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 8485 
(Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996). 
79 See Sunny Handa, A Review of Canadas International Copyright Obligations, 42 
MCGILL L.J. 961, 97678 (1997). 
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differentiate what is a minimum standard of protection from what 
is required by national jurisdictions as a mandatory method in 
providing that minimum threshold of protection.  These treaties 
mandate neither a creativity-linked nor an industrious collection 
standard; they merely assert the traditional position that data are 
not independently protectable subject-matter in copyright as these 
individual items necessarily fail to meet the requirement that they 
be the product of the authors own efforts.  An argument that one 
approach or another stems from these international agreements 
fails to address the desirability of a proprietary approach to the 
problems inherent in protecting factual collections and ignores the 
systemic dimensions of national copyright protection. 
B. The United Kingdom 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to try and present a 
historical analysis of the protection of compilations as literary 
works in British copyright law.80  What can be taken from an 
analysis is that from a general interest in protecting mental labor 
and creativity in the older cases there developed a more refined, 
more mercantile, and more pragmatic attempt to bring some 
doctrinal order to a morass of judgments and statutes relevant to 
copyright protection in the latter half of the 19th century.81  As 
today, much of this change was part of an international agenda of 
reform that was market and technology-driven.82  Thus, just as 
copyright in the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,83 was a 
legislative reaction to the new technology of movable type, the 
first (but confined) statutory requirement of originality was the 
legislative reaction to Daguerres invention of a chemical process 
 
80 It is a large subject due to a myriad of pre-modern cases and interested readers would 
do well to consult Sherman and Bentleys fine history of British intellectual property law 
thru 1911 to gain an overall appreciation of developments in this area. See BRAD 
SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
(1999). 
81 See id. 
82 See WIPO, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY AND PRACTICE 385 
(1997). 
83 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
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to develop photographic plates in 1839.84  Development of the 
originality standard became tied up with both the protection of 
creativity and investment; however, it was the latter value that 
came to dominate when the requirement became of general 
application in the codification of existing jurisprudence for the 
copyright protection of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
works in the Copyright Act of 1911.85  The 1911 Act was also 
significant in that it expressed for the first time in statute form that 
compilations were protectable as literary works, 86 though there 
was a good deal of litigation that settled the point in the affirmative 
from very early on.87 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to present a model of the 
current doctrine.  It is important to note that original compilations 
(other than databases) remain protectable as literary works under 
the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988.88  The terms of the 
Database Directive exclude the protection of computer programs 
from its operation, and thus, the situation that existed before the 
implementation of the Database Directive continues with regard to 
software.89  Given the wide definition of a database in the 
Directive,90 whether there is any scope in the statute for 
compilations that are neither databases nor computer programs 
seems to be an open question. 
The 1988 Act provides that copyright may subsist in original 
literary works in the form of tables or compilations (other than 
databases);91 similar provisions existed in the 191192 and 195693 
 
84 See Gravess Case, 4 L.R.-Q.B. 715, 715 (Eng. 1869) (holding the Fine Art 
Copyright Act 1862 required originality respecting the protection of paintings, drawings, 
and photographs). 
85 Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.). 
86 See id. 
87 Interestingly for lawyers, much of that case law concerned law reports. See, e.g., 
Sweet v. Benning, 139 Eng. Rep. 838 (C.P. 1855); Hodges v. Smith & Welsh, 2 Ir. Eq. 
266 (1840); Sweet v. Maugham, 59 Eng. Rep. 793 (V.C 1840); Sweet v. Shaw, 8 L.J.R. 
216 (Eng. Ch. 1839); Saunders v. Smith, 40 Eng. Rep. 1100 (Ch. 1838); Butterworth v. 
Robinson, 31 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch. 1801); Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740). 
88 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 1, § 3(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter Copyright 
Act of 1988]. 
89 See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3. 
90 See id. 
91 See Copyright Act of 1988. 
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Acts.  No definition is given to the terms original literary work, 
table, or compilation.94  The differences between tables and 
compilations are implicitly regarded as slight.95  While a 
compilation is a collected body of material where the authors 
contribution is found in the arrangement, selection or collection of 
the various elements, a table is a systematic listing of facts with the 
contribution of the author found in the design or choice of the 
organizing system.96  The two terms obviously overlap and for that 
reason the term compilation is used generically in the cases.97 
While there is a great deal of authority on the presence or 
absence of originality in compilations, the definitional issue is not 
featured as a controlling device.  Courts have held that the 
elements included within the compilation need not themselves be 
independently protectable in copyright and all types of subject 
matter can be included.98 
 
92 See Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 35(1) (Eng.). 
93 See Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 48(1) (Eng.). 
94 See Copyright Act of 1988. 
95 See KEVIN GARNETT ET AL., COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 6265 (13th 
ed. 1991). 
96 See id.; 1 HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS 67 
(3d ed. 2000). 
97 See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 95, at 6263. 
98 See, e.g., Matthewson v. Stockdale, 33 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1806) (receipt books); 
Church v. Linton, [1894] 25 O.R. 131 (Can.) (receipt books); Blacklock v. Pearson, 
[1915] 2 Ch. 376 (Eng.) (index of timetables); Jarrold v. Houlston, 69 Eng. Rep. 1294 
(1857) (questions and answers on matters of scientific interest); Collis v. Cater, 78 L.T.R. 
613 (Eng. 1898) (trade catalogues); Purefoy v. Sykes Boxall, 72 R.P.C. 89 (Eng. 1955) 
(trade catalogues); Maple & Co. v. Junior Army and Navy Stores, 21 Ch. D. 369 (Eng. 
1882) (advertisements with trading details); Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697 (Eng. 1866) 
(street directories); Morris v. Ashbee, 7 L.R.-Eq. 34 (Eng. 1868) (street directories); 
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Eng.) 
(lists of football fixtures); Football League v. Littlewoods, 1959 Ch. 637 (Eng.) (coupons 
listing football wagers); Ibcos Computers Ltd., 1994 F.S.R. 275 (Eng. Ch.) (computer 
programs); Cantor Fitzgerald Intl v. Tradition (U.K.) Ltd., 2000 R.P.C 95 (Eng. Ch. 
1999) (computer programs); Mars U.K. Ltd. v. Teknowledge Ltd. (No.1) 2000 F.S.R 138 
(Eng. Ch.) (computer programs); Kenrick v. Danube Collieries, 39 W.R. 473 (Eng. Ch. 
1891) (mining reports); Stevens & Sons v. Waterlow & Sons Ltd., 41 JP 37 (Eng. Ch. D. 
1877) (trade information); Cox v. Land and Water Journal Co., 9 L.R.-Eq. 324 (Eng. 
1869) (hunting information); Independent Television Publns Ltd. v. Time Out Ltd., 1984 
F.S.R 64 (Eng. Ch.) (television listings); Trade Auxiliary Co. v. Middlesbrough and 
District Tradesmens Protection Assn, 40 Ch. D. 425 (Eng. 1889) (details of land sales 
and deeds); Nisbet (J.) & Co. Ltd. v. The Golf Agency, 23 T.L.R. 370 (Eng. 1907) 
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The construction of the originality requirement in British 
copyright law is clearly not one that seeks to set the high 
creativity-linked standard of civilian droit dauteur systems as a 
minimum threshold, but operates as a de minimus control to filter 
out that which lacks even the slightest literary composition with 
reference to the skill, judgment and labor expended by the author 
in the creation of the work.99  It is, as it is widely regarded, a 
sweat of the brow standard.100  The most oft-cited description of 
the dominant British approach to the originality requirement is that 
of Judge Peterson in University of London Press Ltd. v. Universal 
Tutorial Press Ltd.: 
The word original does not in this connection mean that 
the work must be the expression of original or inventive 
thought.  Copyright Acts are not concerned with the 
originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought, and, 
in the case of literary work, with the expression of 
thought in print or writing.  The originality which is 
required relates to the expression of the thought.  But the 
Act does not require that the expression must be in an 
original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied 
from another work -it should originate from the author.101 
Clearly, the construction of the originality requirement does not 
speak to any required reflection of the personality of the author in 
the work, nor novelty of thought.  Further, it is not aided by the 
types of American copyrightability concerns that prevent certain 
types of expressions from being characterized as anything more 
than an unprotectable idea.  Copyright in the functional field is 
used to compensate for the lack of what Professor Cornish has 
sometimes called a roving concept of unfair competition,102 and 
 
(biographical details of golfers); Weatherby & Sons v. Intl Horse Agency and Exch. 
Ltd., [1910] 2 Ch. 297 (Eng.) (horse breeding details); J. Whitaker & Sons Ltd. v. 
Publishers Circular Ltd., 1946 Mac. C.C. 10 (Eng. K.B.) (a list of books); Leslie v. 
Young, 1894 A.C. 335 (Eng.) (a list of railway stations). 
99 See Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Universal Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 
608 (Eng.); Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 291 (Eng.); Walter v. Lane, 1900 
A.C. 539 (Eng.). 
100 Univ. of London Press, [1916] 2 Ch. at 601. 
101 Id. at 60809. 
102 See generally W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1996). 
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is reflective of a pragmatic and practical approach in a system that 
has a mercantile rather than natural-rights based orientation.  Not 
coincidentally, the same conceptual problems that are raised 
regarding the utility of a tort of unfair competition103 are raised 
regarding the originality requirement with respect to compilations.  
The idiosyncratic, subjective judicial scrutiny of the micro-
morality of certain types of transactions through a generalized tort, 
as well as a more transparent approach to the issues when obscured 
in the language of copyright are avoided. 
What is required, then, for subsistence, is a showing of 
substantial labour, skill, or judgment,104 which need not be 
large,105 just more than a trivial effort.106  However, there is no real 
guiding principle as to the extent and nature of this desired 
effort.107  In the case of compilations, merely selecting the 
elements for inclusion, such as quotations from an interview, will 
suffice.108  The difficulty, of course, is in leaving the disposition of 
the issue on such terms to the trier of fact where, in Lord 
MacMillans words, the question must always be one of degree 
and on questions of degree different minds may naturally reach 
different conclusions.109  Although flexibility is preferred to 
certainty, it causes higher administrative costs in the functional 
field that are ultimately borne by consumers. 
In terms of infringement, the action was once brought under 
one of two theories, piracy (unauthorized and substantial copying) 
or literary larceny (the illegitimate appropriation of the fruits of 
the authors labor embodied in the work).110  The law now 
 
103 See Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2), [1984] 156 C.L.R. 414 
(Austl.); MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd., [1976] 66 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can.); ANSELM 
KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 5254 (1997). 
104 Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 28588. 
105 See LADDIE ET AL., supra note 96, at 86. 
106 See Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd. v. Beehive Spinning, 1995 R.P.C. 683 (Eng. Ch.). 
107 See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd., 45 R.P.C. 335 (Eng. Ch. 
1928). 
108 See Express Newspapers plc. v. News (U.K.) Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1320 (Eng. Ch.); 
Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 273. 
109 G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.); 
Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109, 116 (Eng. Ch.). 
110 J.B. RICHARDSON, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 101 (1913); see also Dicks v. Yates, 18 
Ch. D.  76, 90 (Eng. 1881). 
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combines the twoone may copy an insubstantial amount from 
the compilation, but beyond that lies the possibility of liability for 
infringement.111  Thus the balancing device of substantiality 
becomes important.112  The classic statement of the substantiality 
test was given by Lord Pearce in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. 
William Hill (Football) Ltd.: Whether a part is substantial must be 
decided by its quality rather than its quantity. 113  Recently, Lord 
Hoffmann elaborated, holding that a purposive approach must be 
taken: 
But what quality is one looking for?  That question, as it 
seems to me, must be answered by reference to the reason 
why the work is given copyright protection.  In literary 
copyright for example, copyright is conferred (irrespective 
of literary merit) upon an original literary work.  It follows 
that the quality relevant for the purposes of substantiality is 
the literary originality of that which has been copied.  In the 
case of an artistic work, it is the artistic originality of that 
which has been copied.114 
Given that the originality requirement looks to the substantial 
labor, skill, or judgment expended by the author in the 
arrangement, selection or collection of the various elements in 
compilations, substantiality mirrors the originality inquiry in 
considering whether the copying constitutes an infringement 
through an over-borrowing or misappropriation of that same 
investment.115  The basic consideration then becomes whether the 
copyist has conveyed the unprotected facts to the public in a 
manner that has misappropriated the authors investment in his 
own conveyance of those same facts.116  Merely re-ordering the 
 
111 See, e.g., Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 273. 
112 See id. at 27677, 283, 288, 293. 
113 Id. at 293. 
114 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 290, 
29697 (Eng.). 
115 See id. 
116 See Pike v. Nicolas, 5 L.R.-Ch. 251 (Eng. 1869); Jarrold v. Houlston, 69 Eng. Rep. 
1294, 1298 (1857); Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1081 (1839). 
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material or using different language to present it will be 
insufficient to forestall a finding of liability.117 
A prime difficulty arises concerning the strength of this 
mechanism, specifically with regard to information that is not 
otherwise available, or even where otherwise available and the 
copyist is lead to the source through the original.118  In Football 
League v. Littlewoods, the plaintiffs owned a copyright in the 
compilation of the scheduling of football fixtures.119  The court 
found that making the chronological list was not difficult but 
required hard work and painstaking accuracy.120  The defendants 
sent their customers coupons containing lists of fixtures, which 
were admittedly copied from the Leagues chronological list.121  
Although the information was not available from any other source, 
infringement was found.122  The refusal to license is more properly 
seen as a competition concern rather than a copyright matter and 
must ultimately be resolved through competition regulation; this is 
important in terms of both the domestic economy in isolation, and 
in the context of a regional arrangement such as the European 
Union which is based on the free movement of goods and 
services.123 
Again, the matter becomes one of case-by-case analysis framed 
as a question of fact rather than law.124  It is suggested that there is 
no binding principle that narrows the general inquiry or makes the 
 
117 See Bell v. Whitehead, 8 L.J.R.141 (Eng. 1839); Whittingham v. Wooler, 36 Eng. 
Rep. 679 (1817). 
118 See Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697 (Eng. 1866) (where the copyist sent agents to 
verify the addresses and details of places noted in the plaintiffs original street directory); 
Morris v. Wright, 5 L.R.-Ch. 279 (Eng. 1870); Morris v. Ashbee, 7 L.R.-Eq. 34 (Eng. 
1868). 
119 1959 Ch. 637 (Eng.). See also Independent Television Publns Ltd. v. Time Out Ltd., 
1984 F.S.R 64 (Eng. Ch.) (holding that television and radio listings constituted 
compilations and were thus protected as literary copyright works due to the extent of skill 
and labor involved in this creation). 
120 See Football League v. Littlewoods, 1959 Ch. 637, 639 (Eng.). 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
123 See Radio Telefis Eireann v. E.C. Commn of the European Communities, [1995] 4 
C.M.L.R. 718. 
124 See G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.); 
Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109, 116 (Eng. Ch.). 
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analysis more predictable.125  The resolution of such issues is very 
much a question of evidence to determine; to draw on the words of 
Page Wood V.C., whether the defendant has taken away the 
plaintiffs labor expended in producing the work, 126 with the 
competitive nexus between the parties being quite influential in the 
application of the substantiality test.127  Despite these problems, it 
is interesting to note that this traditional sweat of the brow or 
industrious collection approach was recently followed in 
Australia.128 
C. The United States 
Although American copyright law is quite similar to its British 
progenitor, there are quite substantial differences in the protection 
of functional works such as factual compilations.  First, the federal 
protection is constitutionally based and is subject to the fixed 
jurisdictional boundaries necessary in such a federal system, and 
thus sits alongside state misappropriation protection.129  Second, 
since at least Baker v. Selden,130 American copyright law has 
constructed the idea-expression dichotomy as a controlling 
device in the development of copyright doctrine and the types of 
works and the nature of authorship that legitimately falls within the 
constitutional grant.131  Though courts have been known to adopt a 
more pragmatic stance,132 there is a systemic reluctance to protect 
 
125 See id. 
126 See Scott v. Sandford, [1867] 3 L.R.-Eq. 718, 72324 (Eng.). 
127 See Trade Auxiliary Co. v. Middlesbrough and District Tradesmens Protection 
Assn, 40 Ch. D. 425, 428429 (Eng. 1889); Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697, 701703 
(Eng. 1866). 
128 See Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Marketing Sys. Pty Ltd. [2001] FCA 612, affd, 
[2002] F.C.A.F.C. 112 (Austl.). 
129 See, e.g., Intl News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1919). 
130 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
131 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.). 
132 See Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Adver. Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671, 676 
(D. Minn. 1987) (The first axiom of copyright is that copyright protection covers only 
the expression of ideas and not ideas themselves. . . .  The second axiom of copyright is 
that the first axiom is more of an amorphous characterization than it is a principled 
guidepost.). 
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the purely functional rather than the creative (some may say 
wisely).133  This differing approach to functional expression is 
clearly brought out in the American134 and British135 approaches to 
the protection of computer programs.  While the former places a 
clear emphasis on questions of authorship and subsistence of 
copyright and uses such doctrines as merger136 and scenes à  
faire137 to limit copyrightability as a matter of law, the British 
law concentrates its attention at the substantiality stage and the 
determination of the issues through questions of fact.138  This 
author would hazard to state, however, that both reach the same 
conclusions in the majority of cases.  Third, unlike British law 
which (usually) prizes certainty far above flexibility and which 
does not favor generalized public interest defenses, American law 
clearly speaks to copyright as a flexible property right which is 
granted in the public interest and which must be construed and 
 
133 See Ibcos Computers Ltd., 1994 F.S.R. 275, 29192 (Eng. Ch.) (discussing the 
refusal of United States copyright law to protect solely functional elements). 
134 See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995); 
Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
135 See, e.g., Cantor Fitzgerald Intl v. Tradition (U.K.) Ltd., 2000 R.P.C 95 (Eng. Ch.). 
136 See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 
1990); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986). 
137 See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997). 
138 See, e.g., Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc, [2001] 3 
W.L.R. 290, 29697 (Eng.); Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109, 
116 (Eng. Ch.); Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd. v. Beehive Spinning, 1995 R.P.C. 683 (Eng. 
Ch.); Radio Telefis Eireann v. E.C. Commn of the European Communities, [1995] 4 
C.M.L.R. 718 (Eng.); Express Newspapers plc. v. News (U.K.) Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 
1320 (Eng. Ch.); Independent Television Publns Ltd. v. Time Out Ltd., 1984 F.S.R 64 
(Eng. Ch.); Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2), [1984] 156 C.L.R. 
414 (Austl.); MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd., [1976] 66 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can.); Ladbroke 
(Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Eng.); Football 
League v. Littlewoods, 1959 Ch. 637 (Eng.); G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank 
Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Univ. Tutorial 
Press Ltd., 45 R.P.C. 335 (Eng. Ch.) 1928; Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Universal 
Tutorial Press Ltd, [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 608 (Eng.); Trade Auxiliary Co. v. Middlesbrough 
and District Tradesmens Protection Assn, 40 Ch. D. 425, 42829 (Eng. 1889); Morris v. 
Wright, 5 L.R.-Ch. 279 (Eng. 1870); Pike v. Nicolas, 5 L.R.-Ch. 251 (Eng. 1869); Morris 
v. Ashbee, 7 L.R.-Eq. 34 (Eng. 1868); Scott v. Sandford, 3 L.R.-Eq. 718, 72324 (Eng. 
1867); Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697 (Eng. 1866); Jarrold v. Houlston, 69 Eng. Rep. 
1294, 1298 (1857); Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1081 (1839); Bell v. 
Whitehead, 8 L.J.R.141 (Eng. 1839); Whittingham v. Wooler, 36 Eng. Rep. 679 (1817). 
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applied to serve the public interest.139  This is more than a doctrinal 
difference; it is a matter of legal culture determining where 
balancing decisions will be made, by whom they will be made, and 
whether these decisions ought to be made in the context of private 
litigation.  It is a characteristic of fundamental importance in the 
American system, and a fundamental difference to other common 
law copyright regimes. 
Like British law, American law treats the compilation and its 
contents separately.  Unlike British law, American law hesitates 
over the manner in which copyright might attach to facts.  Both 
systems may protect elements of a compilation as original literary 
works in their own right, however, facts are not considered to be 
copyrightable subject-matter per se in the United States,140 based 
on constructions of the idea-expression dichotomy,141 again 
through such devices as the merger doctrine142 and conceptions of 
authorship.143  Since copyright protection of compilations is thin, 
these fact considerations become quite significant.  This system 
differs from the British law, where the issue is framed merely as 
one of originality in the sense of conveying information or 
instruction without need to deny the protection merely as it might 
protect a fact.144 
 
139 Hence, the importance of the quasi-equitable fair use defense, which is especially 
significant in the institutional balancing of protection and access interests. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (2000) ([T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction 
in copies or phonorecords . . . , for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
140 See Nesters Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 
1992) (holding that although facts themselves cannot be copyrighted, the presentation of  
facts will be protected where the creator has demonstrated sufficient creativity). 
141 See Harper & Row Publisher, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
142 However, it is clear that where there is more than one way to express a fact and that 
the expression in question can be said to reflect creative choices in presentation, the 
merger doctrine can be overcome and copyright may subsist under the American statute. 
See generally CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 
(2d Cir. 1994); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991). 
143 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
34445 (1991). 
144 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consultants Intl Ltd., [1981] 3 W.L.R. 541 
(Eng. C.A.).  The approach in Canada is less onerous in that only an expression of an idea 
is required. See, e.g., Intl Bus. Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers Inc., [1984] 12 
D.L.R.4th 351 (Can.). 
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With respect to compilations, the Copyright Act of 1976 
provides that a work formed by the collection and assembling of 
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or 
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole 
constitutes an original work of authorship145 may be protected.146  
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,147 Rural 
Telephone Services published local yellow and white page 
directories for its subscribers.148  Rural was bound to do so under 
state law.149 Feist sought to license the data and to release its own 
directory, but to include a larger catchment area than Rural 
Telephones directory and thus attract a different class of 
consumers.150  Rural refused to license the information,151 and 
Feist copied the listings without authorization to do so.152  Feist 
went further and took steps to verify Rurals collection as accurate 
before using the data within its own directory.153  The United 
States Supreme Court applied a creativity-linked standard based on 
the construction of the federal power to legislate in the area of 
intellectual property as one directed at the public interest in 
encouraging new works, rather than merely protecting the 
investment of resources in the work at issue.154  In a famous 
passage, Justice OConnor wrote: 
 This case concerns the interaction of two well-
established propositions. The first is that facts are not 
copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts 
generally are. . . . 
 The key to resolving the tension lies in understanding 
why facts are not copyrightable. The sine qua non of 
 
145 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining compilations). 
146 See id. § 103(a) (including compilations in literary works). 
147 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
148 Id. at 340. 
149 See id. at 363. 
150 See id. at 343. 
151 See id.  This was held in violation of antitrust principles by the district court. See 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc. v. Feist Publns Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610 (D. Kan. 1990), revd, 
957 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1992). 
152 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 343. 
153 See id. at 34344. 
154 See id. at 349. 
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copyright is originality.  To qualify for copyright 
protection, a work must be original to the author.  Original, 
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work 
was independently created by the author (as opposed to 
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.  To be sure, the 
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice. 
. . . . 
 It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the 
compilers labor may be used by others without 
compensation.  As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, 
however, this is not some unforeseen byproduct of a 
statutory scheme.  It is, rather, the essence of copyright, 
and a constitutional requirement.  The primary objective of 
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.  To this 
end, copyright assures authors the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the 
ideas and information conveyed by a work . . . .  This 
principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression 
dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.  As applied 
to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original 
written expression, only the compilers selection and 
arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied 
at will.  This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate.  It is 
the means by which copyright advances the progress of 
science and art.155 
Thus, an original work of authorship under the copyright 
statute is the product of the authors own efforts and includes at 
least some minimal degree of creativity.156  The creativity standard 
here is not akin to the authors own intellectual creation 
standard, as in those civilian systems in which the personality of 
the author must be reflected in the work, but furthers the same 
 
155 Id. at 345, 34950 (citations omitted). 
156 See id. at 349. 
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policy goals that are familiar to British copyright: rewarding the 
judgment and taste of the author through the copyright grant, and 
encouraging others to act likewise, but in no case making 
unavailable the general ideas or discrete matters of fact that ought 
to be available to them.157  The protection encourages and supports 
a principled construction of authorship, not ownership of 
knowledge.158 
In enforcing this modicum of creativity approach, the 
experience post-Feist has not been an unduly restrictive oneas 
one court put it, copyright protection in compilations may be 
thin,159 but not anorexic.160  Thus, original compilations have 
been protected in the form of directories of businesses,161 lists of 
the statistics of baseball pitchers on nine selected criteria,162 a 
model building code,163 facts for software user interface,164 guides 
to the used prices of cars165 and collectible coins,166 and codes and 
descriptions of dental procedures.167 
 
157 See, e.g., id. at 340. 
158 See, e.g., id. 
159 That is, protection is restricted to the original parts of the compilations selection, 
coordination, or arrangement. 
160 See Key Publn, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publg Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
161 See EPM Communications, Inc. v. Notara, Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Key Publn, Inc., 945 F.2d at 509. 
162 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991). 
163 See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Intl, Inc., 158 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 2001). 
164 See Engg Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994). 
165 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
166 See CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999). 
167 See Am. Dental Assn v. Delta Dental Plans Assn, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).  
Reports of judgments have been refused protection, see Matthew Bender & Co. v. West 
Publg Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publg Co., 158 
F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998); but see Oasis Publg Co. v. West Publg Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 
(D. Minn. 1996); as have a yellow pages directory, see Bellsouth Adver. & Publg Corp. 
v. Donnelly Info. Publg, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); but see Warren Publg v. 
Microdos Data, Inc., 53 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995); a list of part numbers automatically 
created with the manufacturers numbering system, see Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge 
Corp., 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001); charters of horse racing statistics, see Victor Lalli 
Enter. Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991); and a Hebrew bible 
with symbols to permit searches in compliance with Jewish law, see Torah Soft Ltd. v. 
Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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The requisite creative efforts may be expended upon the 
selection of the data.168  As the selection must be creative, there is 
an obvious problem in automatic selection of all relevant datafor 
example, the telephone directory in Feist itself169or selection 
criteria that is in and of itself unoriginal.170  Equally obvious is that 
where there are creative choices in using unoriginal criteria, the 
requisite modicum of creativity will be shown.171  Thus, a list of 
best objects as selected by the author will do.172  With regard to 
co-coordinating and arranging data, the same considerations of 
automatic factors like page numbering 173 and unoriginal criteria 
apply with the additional control of the merger doctrine.174  
Creative choices in selecting the right fact in the right way will 
satisfy the requirement of minimal creativity.175 
The degree to which the Feist standard has improved the law is 
certainly open to debate, and the paradox in relying on a creativity 
norm as a means of encouraging more utilitarian works in the form 
of creative factual compilations (which by their very nature may 
intrude on the objective veracity of the contents presented), has not 
gone unnoticed.176  The result is to leave protection of databases in 
an uncertain state, complicated by varying interpretations of the 
Feist decision in the various federal circuits.177  This institutional 
 
168 See Tora Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 278. 
169 See Feist Publn, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
170 See id. at 349. 
171 See O.P. Solutions, Inc. v. Intellectual Prop. Network, Ltd., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1818 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that format accorded with industry convention was not 
sufficiently original). 
172 Id. at 1820. 
173 See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publg Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998). 
174 See id. at 683. 
175 See C.D.N., Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the process of 
pricing coins satisfied required degree of creativity). 
176 E.g., Jane Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives to Protect Works of Low Authorship, in 
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE 
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 55 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). 
177 Compare Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that part numbers lacked sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection), and 
Am. Dental Assn v. Delta Dental Plans Assn, 126 F.3d 977, 97980 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that taxonomy of dental procedures was copyrightable), with Warren Publg v. 
Microdos Data, Inc., 52 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated by 115 F.3d 1509 (11th 
Cir. 1997). 
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uncertainty propels the wary businessperson to seek support 
elsewherein contract178 or misappropriation179 (which would not 
appear to be a spent force as far as time-sensitive dynamic 
databases are concerned),180 as well as whatever proprietary-based 
cause is applicable under the circumstances.181  Based on the 
uncertain nature of ancillary actions at the state level,182 the 
efficacy and cost of technological self-help measures,183 and the 
presence of the EU Database Directive with its reciprocity 
 
178 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a shrinkwrap license is a binding contract). 
179 Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (stating that 
misappropriation may still apply to facts).  After Feist, the state misappropriation action 
can only be maintained if it protects intellectual property not within the subject matter of 
copyright and/or asserts rights not equivalent to copyright.  More will be required, in 
particular timeliness if the claim seeks to analogize to the generally accepted hot-news 
doctrine articulated in Intl News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
Compare Natl Basketball Assn v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(limiting the hot news exception to cases where information generated at a cost to the 
plaintiff and is time sensitive, the defendants use constitutes free-riding, the parties are 
in direct competition and free-riding creates a disincentive that threatens production of 
the product), and Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. 
Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that while the state would allow cause of 
action based on misappropriation of hot news, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the criteria 
laid out in National Basketball Association, 105 F. 3d at 845), with Pollstar v. Gigmania 
Ltd. 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 97980 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (applying hot news elements 
outlined in National Basketball Association, 105 F. 3d at 845). See also United States 
Golf Assn [USGA] v. Arroyo Software Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1979, 1985 (Cal. 
1999) (holding that the USGAs claims are not pre-empted by federal copyright law). 
180 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of 
Databases in the United States and Abroad (1997), 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 15764 
(1997) (discussing the possible application of the hot news exception and 
misappropriation theory to databases). 
181 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 106970 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (holding that eBay would likely prevail on its assertion that Bidders Edge 
interfered with eBays possessory interest in its electronic database); Ticketmaster Corp. 
v. Tickets.com Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1347 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting motion 
to dismiss claims of misappropriation and trespass of factual information posted on 
website); Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding 
that party would likely prevail on claim of trespass to chattels where defendant used a 
software robot to collect information from competitors database). 
182 See Amy C. Sullivan, When the Creative is the Enemy of the True: Database 
Protection in the U.S. and Abroad, 29 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASSN Q.J., 34652 
(2001). 
183 See id. at 345. 
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provision,184 a number of proposals have suggested legislative 
reform to construct sui generis protection of databases in the 
United States (though such proposals languish in Congress).185 
D. Canada 
As in other jurisdictions, the protection of factual compilations 
in Canadian law has emphasized the difficulties in determining 
originality in this form of utilitarian subject matter.  However, the 
most recent cases, arising in part from the tensions inherent in 
Canadas bijural tradition and the influence of American law on 
domestic doctrine, have tended to complicate matters by 
alternatively pulling towards and pushing away from conceptions 
of creative authorship in general and specifically with regard to 
compilations of factual material.  In the process, the law has 
become uncertain both in doctrine and direction.  The cases seem 
to say that intellectual creation as used in the definition of a 
compilation under the statute186 requires self-generation (not 
copying from another) and something in addition to not being 
copied.187  Much like the British jurisprudence, with which 
Canadian law in the main aligns itself,188 that something more is 
an indistinct category (it may now include creativity in addition to 
the usual vagaries such as taste, discretion, skill, judgment, 
industry and labor), ensuring that the investment of resources and 
effort is of the right sort and controls the extent of the entitlement 
 
184 See id. at 354. 
185 See, e.g., The Database Investment and Intellectual Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 
3531, 104th Cong.; The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 
1858, 106th Cong.; The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act of 1999, H.R. 2652, 
106th Cong. See Sullivan, supra note 182, at 35671; Ginsburg, supra note 176, at 55. 
186 Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42,  § 2 (2001) ([C]ompilation means (a) a 
work resulting from the selection or arrangement of literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic 
works or of parts thereof, or (b) a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of 
data.). 
187 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385, 
para. 214 (Can.) (Rothstein, J.A., concurring); see also id. para. 55 (noting that it also 
requires something more than merely copying existing elements). 
188 See CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th at 385; U&R Tax Services v. H&R Block 
Canada Ltd., [1995] C.P.R. 257, 264 (Can.); Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed Co. v. 
Sleep-King Adjustable Bed Co., [1984] 3 C.P.R.3d 81, 84 (Can.). 
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that might be claimed in such subject-matter.189  In essence, like 
British law prior to the Database Directive, the Canadian law 
recognizes that the further one gets away from traditional literary 
works, the inter-related questions of subsistence and infringement 
are difficult to determine in the circumstances of an individual case 
and, particularly so in factual compilations.190  Again, like British 
doctrine, it is hard to pin down exactly what the magical quality of 
something more is with any precision.  The present copyright 
revision exercise, though framed in terms of the agenda set out 
through the substantive provisions of the relevant WIPO treaties, 
may yet settle the issue of database protection more satisfactorily 
than the judges have been able to do thus far within the constraints 
of the Copyright Act.191 
As a preliminary matter, it is worthwhile to consider the nature 
of the right set out in the Copyright Act.192  Like the 1911 British 
statute on which it was originally modeled, the Canadian statute 
creates a right to control reproduction and exploitation of various 
forms of protectable expression (not all requiring originality).193  
Unlike other jurisdictions, however, Canadian courts have been 
quite reluctant to label the right as a proprietary one, preferring to 
characterize it as simply a statutory right.194  Notwithstanding, 
this author would suggest that the protection created under the 
Canadian statute is indeed proprietary in the conventional sense.  
Though created by statute in relation to an intangible, the right 
sufficiently satisfies the traditional incidents of ownership under 
 
189 See Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed, 3 C.P.R.3d at 84. 
190 Cf. id. para. 55; Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, para. 42 (Can.). 
191 See Canadian Copyright Act. 
192 See id. 
193 See Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 
(Can.); id. para. 114 (Gonthier, J., dissenting). 
194 The Canadian Copyright Act is somewhat exceptional in not defining, but treating, 
the right as a property right.  As Canadian Supreme Court Justice Estey has noted, 
copyright law is neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is statutory law.  
It neither cuts across existing rights in property or conduct nor falls in between rights and 
obligations heretofore existing in the common law.  Copyright legislation simply creates 
rights and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in the statute.  This 
creature of statute has been known to the law of England at least since the days of Queen 
Anne when the first copyright statute was passed.  It does not assist the interpretative 
analysis to import tort concepts.  The legislation speaks for itself . . . . Compo Co. v. 
Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] S.C.R. 357, 37273 (Can.). 
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the so-called Hohfeld/Honoré orthodoxy; that is, the rights of 
possession, use, management, and the reception of income; the 
power to transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon; the immunity from 
expropriation by the state; and liability for execution of a judgment 
are all present in relation to the right.195  At the same time, the right 
is not a creature of common law nor is it unlimited in term or 
extent; like a patent, the right is limited by time and statutory (and 
perhaps equitable) defenses operate to limit its enforcement.  
While the judicial disinclination to apply the term property to the 
right obviously reflects a pragmatic concern for the delicate 
balancing of interests that is the essence of intellectual property 
law, this author would suggest that withholding the property label 
starts the analysis on the wrong foot. 
Property, properly understood, is not such a rigid concept that 
its application to copyright automatically alters the balance 
between the provision of economic incentives to create protectable 
expression and legitimate interests in the dissemination of such 
works;196 in other words, it need not be seen as concluding rather 
than beginning an inquiry into the proper balancing of competing 
interests.197  Moreover, given the definitional clarity derived from 
the statute and the internal provision of criminal proscriptions, the 
sorts of concerns that arise in relation to an indefinite category of 
valuable intangibles like confidential information198 do not arise 
 
195 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 2123 (1913) (discussing the malleability of the 
term property to designate a physical object and/or a right with relation to the object); 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
26 YALE L.J. 710, 72225 (1917).  For a criticism of Hohfelds analysis of the correlative 
rights and duties in respect to both in rem and in personam rights, see JEREMY WALDRON, 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 
IOWA L. REV. 277, 28497 (1998); J.E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of 
Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 724732 (1996).  For a discussion of Hohfelds 
analysis, see UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION (2000); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22 
(1990); A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 109 (A.G. Guest 
ed., 1961). 
196 Théberge, 17 C.P.R.4th para. 30 (approving Justice Willess famous dicta in Millar 
v. Taylor, [1769] E.R. 201, 218) (Can.). 
197 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of 
Property? A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 604 (1994). 
198 R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 (Can.). 
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here.  Rather than rejecting an association with property concepts, 
it is desirable to align the content of copyright with the larger law 
and theory in regard to legal entitlements.  It is easily recognizable 
that labels have meaning and doctrines in different areas are 
conceptually linked.  Regardless of whether one takes a 
traditionally conservative or more expansive, socially-constructed 
view of property rights,199 property as a concept and legal 
institution is a meaningful one, and conceptual alignment between 
these two areas of the larger law of entitlements seems to be a 
useful one.  The point is not to throw off intellectual property law 
for a return to free-ranging common law protections, which may be 
the root fear, but to construct meaningful contexts in which to 
determine the content of socially desirable entitlements to 
resources and things of value. 
Indeed, as revealed in the latest judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Canada dealing with substantive copyright doctrine and the 
troubling regional split in that court, Canadian copyright law is 
caught between the tensions generally associated with common 
law copyright and civilian droit dauteur traditions.200  It has been 
suggested that at least part of the problem in Theberge is a 
reluctance to accept a unique Canadian implementation of a 
universal principle; the lost truth being that copyright is the same 
everywhere, the only nuances being provided artificially by legal 
tools and techniques, which differ from one State to the next and 
that undue reliance on received common law visions distort the 
efficacy of any independent analysis.201  With respect, this is 
somewhat simplistic.  Each jurisdiction must be taken 
independently and assessed with regard to its own developed 
traditions and needs; Canada is sovereign in its own law-making.  
However, and flowing from, rather than opposed to, the need for 
 
199 For discussion of socially constructed property rights in valuable intangibles, see 
CRAIG ROTHERHAM, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE: RIGHTS, WRONGS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
(Mathew H. Kramer ed., Palgrave, 2001); Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252 (1991); Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 36 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 117 (1988); Sam Ricketson, Reaping without Sowing: Unfair 
Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo-Australian Law, U. NEW S. 
WALES L.J. 1 (1984). 
200 Théberge, 17 S.C.R. at 34. 
201 NORMAND TAMARO, THE 2002 ANNOTATED COPYRIGHT ACT, at xii (2002). 
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jurisprudential self-determination, this author would dispute the 
claim that copyright is (or should be) the same everywhere.  
Differing jurisdictions judge the nature and level of personal 
entitlement differently in respect to discrete forms of subject 
matter, and are informed by differing theoretical perspectives on 
the nature of both personal and public entitlement.  These 
differences can be both substantive and structural.  Conceptions 
regarding the genus property, informed by public policy 
considerations in respect to the species intellectual property, 
should not be eliminated completely from the analysis.  It is the 
conceptual framework in which the analysis should be conducted.  
At the same time, not all entitlements need to be full-blown 
property rights, and that is a point that this author suggests is 
important in database protection.  Perhaps it is not a failure to 
consider the international or comparative context that is at the root 
of the problem, rather than a reluctance to place the difficult 
theoretical issues within a conventional doctrinal frame.  To be 
fair, this author would suggest that Justice Binnie did just that in 
Theberge.202 
Turning to the issue at hand, perhaps the most controversial 
decision in the Canadian copyright law in recent years is that of the 
Federal Court of Appeal in Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. 
American Business Information Inc.203  In Tele-Direct, using the 
amendments to the 1993 Copyright Act as a point of departure, the 
court took the view that Canadian copyright law has been, and 
should be, accommodative of creative authorship.204  Hence, and 
with an eye towards regional harmonization of laws through 
NAFTA, the Canadian law regarding the copyright protection of 
factual compilations ought to draw itself in line with the Feist 
approach in the United Statesauthorship, and not mere self-
generation, should become the focal point of judicial concern.205  It 
is a controversial position that has been subject of much scrutiny. 
Tele-Direct, occurring after the decision of the Canadian 
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to 
 
202 Théberge, 17 S.C.R. at 34. 
203 [1998] 2 F.C. 22, 38 (Can.). 
204 See id. at 39. 
205 See id. 
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regard raw telephone subscriber data as not protectable in 
copyright and properly subject to mandatory licensing,206 involved 
the question of the copyright protection of a yellow pages 
directories published and distributed in both the provinces of 
Ontario and Quebec.207  At trial, Justice McGillis held that the 
subscriber data were not subject to copyright (and thus were not 
independently protected), and that the sub-compilation of these 
data was structured according to industry convention such that the 
headings created by the publishers to accompany the data were 
similarly commonplace (and thus that the originality test was not 
met, even on the standard of labor, skill and judgment).208  Even if 
there was copyright in the Tele-Direct compilation, there was no 
infringement.209 
On appeal, the trial judgment was upheld on different 
reasoning.210  In the Federal Court of Appeal, and after reviewing 
the record below, Décary J.A. turned to the importance of the 
changes to the Copyright Act through the NAFTA enabling 
legislation,211 which it was held did two things: broadened the 
categories of compilations beyond literary works to include 
artistic, dramatic and musical works and amended the Act to 
reflect article 1705(1)(b) of NAFTA.212  NAFTA, article 
1705(1)(b) provides, in the same terms as TRIPS, article 10(2): 
Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine 
readable or other form, which by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations, shall 
 
206 See Bell CanadaProvision of Telephone Directory Data Base Information in 
Machine-Readable Form, Telecom Decision CRTC 90-12 (June 14, 1990); Bell 
CanadaDirectory File Service, Telecom Decision CRTC 92-1 (March 3, 1992); 
Graham A. Knight, The Fall and Rise of Sweat of the Brow, 13 INTELL. PROP. J. 337, 348 
(19981999). 
207 Tele-Direct (Publns) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info., Inc., [1996] 74 C.P.R.3d 72, 74, affd, 
[1998] 2 F.C. 22, 38 (Can. 1997). 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 101 
210 Tele-Direct, [1998] 2 F.C. at 22. 
211 The Canadian Copyright Act was amended to comply with NAFTA, see supra note 
52, art. 1705(1)(b), regarding the definition of compilations, through the NAFTA 
Implementation Act, see supra note 52, § 53. 
212 Tele-Direct, [1998] 2 F.C. at 29. 
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be protected as such.213  The effect of these provisions, it was 
held, was a deliberate departure from the prevailing sweat of the 
brow approach, towards the adoption of the Feist test.214  Décary 
J.A. stated: 
Clearly, what the parties to the Agreement wanted to 
protect were compilations of data that embody original 
expression within the meaning of [the Berne] Convention 
and that constitute intellectual creations.  The use of 
these last two words is most revealing: compilations of data 
are to be measured by standards of intellect and creativity.  
As these standards were already present in Anglo-Canadian 
jurisprudenceas we shall see laterthe author can only 
assume that the Canadian government in signing the 
Agreement and the Canadian Parliament in adopting the 
1993 amendments to the Copyright Act expected the Court 
to follow the creativity school of cases rather than the 
industrious collection school.215 
After re-iterating that the law has always been that only original 
compilations may attract copyright and that the threshold of 
originality is a low one, Décary J.A. stated: 
It is true that in many of the cases we have been referred to, 
the expression skill, judgment or labour has been used to 
describe the test to be met by a compilation in order to 
qualify as original and, therefore, to be worthy of copyright 
protection.  It seems to me, however, that whenever or 
was used instead of and, it was in a conjunctive rather 
than in a disjunctive way.  It is doubtful that considerable 
labour combined with a negligible degree of skill and 
judgment will be sufficient in most situations to make a 
compilation of data original.  One should always keep in 
mind that one of the purposes of the copyright legislation, 
 
213 TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 10(2); NAFTA, supra note 52, art. 1705(1)(b).  Both 
TRIPS, art. 10(2), and NAFTA, art. 1705(1)(b), provide further that [s]uch protection, 
which shall not extend to the data or material itself, shall be without  prejudice to any 
copyright subsisting in the data or material itself. Id. 
214 See Tele-Direct, [1998] 2 F.C. at 3132 para 15. 
215 Id.  The presumption was rejected by Linden J.A. in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385, paras. 40, 55 (Can.). 
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historically, has been to protect and reward the intellectual 
effort of the author (for a limited period of time) in the 
work (emphasis added).  The use of the word copyright 
in the English version of the Act has obscured the fact that 
what the Act fundamentally seeks to protect is le droit 
dauteur.  While not defined in the Act, the word author 
conveys a sense of creativity and ingenuity.  The author 
does not read these cases which have adopted the sweat of 
the brow approach in matters of compilations of data as 
having asserted that the amount of labour would in itself be 
a determinative source of originality.  If they did, their 
approach was wrong and is irreconcilable with the 
standards of intellect and creativity that were expressly set 
out in NAFTA and endorsed in the 1993 amendments to the 
Copyright Act and that were already recognized in Anglo-
Canadian law.216 
Adopting the Feist test, it was held that the test of originality in 
respect to compilations of data is properly one of labor, skill and 
judgment, based on some low threshold of creativity on the part 
of the author of the database; the policy concern being to support a 
robust conception of authorship in structuring the statutory 
entitlement and not to extend that entitlement directly to factual 
material.217  Though the standard of creativity was set at a 
minimum threshold, this was a significant departure from existing 
practice. 
A number of points can be made in relation to Tele-Direct.  
First, the court adopts an attitude towards American constitutional 
and intellectual property law that is itself not very nuanced.  It 
takes no account of the differing construction of the idea-
expression dichotomy in American jurisprudence, of judicially-
developed principles such as the merger doctrine, nor of the 
systemic hostility to functional expression.  To paraphrase Lord 
Hailsham, it is true that each of Canada, Britain, and the United 
States doesnt allow copyright to attach to facts, but it all depends 
 
216 Id. para. 29. 
217 Id. para. 34. 
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what you mean by a fact.  To remove Feist from its context and 
drop it into the Canadian law of copyright is problematic. 
Second, and perhaps most important, it is unclear as to what 
Décary J.A. intends by labeling Canada as a droit dauteur system 
and emphasizing authorship.218  As Justice Binnie recently held in 
the Theberge litigation, the distinction between personal author-
centered interests associated with protection of moral rights and 
owner-centered mercantile interests association with copyright is 
both a real and profound one in Canadian law.219  Copyright is of 
much less exalted status, and is an exploitation-oriented right 
bound up with a conception of artistic and literary works 
essentially as articles of commerce.220  Creative authorship in the 
civilian tradition is foreign to such a conception of copyright; 
authors and owner-assignees are protected in copyright, but 
authorship less so.  Given the mercantile orientation of the 
copyright, the traditional hostility of common law jurisdictions to 
creative authorship is primarily due to the difficulties in leaving 
such an open-ended creativity standard to judges in the context of a 
system that is predicated on the vindication of narrow economic 
interests towards economic goals rather than the fulfillment of 
authorship-centered duties.  Typical are the recent comments by 
Linden J.A. on the point: 
Inevitably, judges will be forced to create their own 
definitions of creativity, resulting in substantial uncertainty 
and further jeopardizing the public benefit that accrues 
from the production of new and original works.  The fact 
that an objective and coherent definition of creative is 
elusive at best and that creativity can sometimes connote 
qualities that are not required of an original work makes 
it preferable to avoid such unpredictable labels when 
assessing originality.221 
In principle, such a creativity-linked entitlement is neither 
undesirable nor impractical, though it may be unsuitable for 
 
218 See CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th at 385. 
219 Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 (Can.). 
220 Id. paras. 12, 15, 22. 
221 CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th para. 58. 
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inclusion in the system of copyright as presently set out in the 
prevailing statute and accumulated jurisprudence. 
Third, the position that Décary J.A. has accepted in relation to 
NAFTA, raising the bar in relation to the protection of 
compilations through a more stringent construction of the 
Berne/NAFTA/TRIPS phrase intellectual creation, is dubious.222  
As an initial point, it is questionable whether the relevant sections 
of NAFTA speak to such substantive standards in a purposeful way 
at all, rather than merely tying the accepted status quo to regional 
trade-based arrangements.223  Indeed, chapter 17 of NAFTA itself 
arises from the work of the GATT official who drafted TRIPS, and 
found its way into the treaty when the NAFTA negotiators 
abandoned their own documents to proceed from the draft TRIPS 
agreement once it was complete.224  Second, the proposition that it 
was in the mind of the Canadian negotiators (and later legislators) 
to adopt the Feist standard in relation to factual compilations 
seems artificial, given that the American law was not fully 
developed at the time the treaty was negotiated and the matter was 
not a specific topic of negotiation.  Finally, to argue that NAFTA is 
more deferential to Berne than TRIPS would seem to undercut the 
principle of TRIPS itself.  That such a requirement may be 
desirable is one thing, but that it is mandated by international or 
regional agreement is a novel and unconvincing assertion. 
Indeed, that Tele-Direct should be properly regarded as 
fundamentally altering Canadian conceptions of originality seems 
untenable after such an impression was recently corrected by a 
differently constituted panel of the Federal Court of Appeal.225  In 
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, the question 
of originality at large and in various types of legal materials, 
ranging from headnotes to monographs, was given extensive 
 
222 This point was rejected by Linden J.A. See id. para. 27. 
223 Ron J.T. Corbett, Impact of NAFTA and TRIPS on Intellectual Property Rights 
Protections in Canada and the United States, 6 NAFTA: LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 591 
(2000). 
224 Martin D.H. Woodward, TRIPS and NAFTAs Chapter 17: How Will Trade-Related 
Multilateral Agreements Affect International Copyright?, 31 TEX. INTL L.J. 269, 274 
(1996). 
225 CCH Canadian Ltd., 212 D.L.R.4th at 385. 
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consideration.226  Both Linden J.A., for the majority, and Rothstein 
J.A., concurring, explicitly rejected any reading of Tele-Direct as 
fundamentally altering Canadian copyright from the general 
approach shared with British law or of altering subsistence of 
copyright at large.227  All members of the court supported a 
traditional view of originality, which requires that the protected 
work originate from the author and be produced by more than mere 
copious effort expended in slavishly copying another work.228  
Creativity, then, does not function as a foundational criterion. 
While strictly obiter, the majority held that after Tele-Direct 
there was no alteration at all of subsistence requirements, while the 
minority held that there might be a change specifically in the area 
of factual compilations.229  Thus, Linden J.A. found: 
The author acknowledges that it is more difficult to apply 
the standard of originality to some types of works, such as 
compilations, than to traditional forms of expression, such 
as novels, sculptures or plays.  The further one gets away 
from traditional literary works, the less obvious it becomes 
that a work has not been copied.  Compilations of data, for 
instance, typically do not display an authors uniquely 
identifiable flare, nor exhibit, on their face, indicia of the 
authors personal style or manner of expression.  (citation 
omitted)  This makes it difficult to establish whether 
compilations are original or are merely copies.  In addition, 
some compilations may be comprised of elements that are 
copied from other works or parts of works in which 
copyright may or may not otherwise subsist.  Because the 
selection and arrangement of the underlying elements, not 
 
226 See id. 
227 See id. paras. 38, 40, 4346; id. para. 218 (Rothstein, J.A., concurring). 
228 See id. para. 31 (approving the dicta of Lord Oliver in Interlego A.G. v. Tyco 
Industries Inc., 1989 A.C. 217, 26263 (Eng. P.C.) (Skill, labour or judgment merely in 
the process of copying cannot confer originality. . . .  A well executed tracing is the result 
of much labour and skill but remains what it is, a tracing.)  Interlego, however, was not 
a compilation case but one involving derivative works in the context of an attempt to 
extend patent and design rights which had terminated.  In the context of an artistic work, 
as was the nature of the work at issue, more than slavish copying was required
specifically a discernable visual dissimilarity between the original and the copy.). 
229 See id. para. 55. 
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the elements themselves, must be original, a compiler must 
demonstrate something more than merely copying those 
elements into a new work before the Act will award 
copyright protection.  However, Anglo-Canadian copyright 
law does not require creativity to establish that such a 
work is not a mere copy.230 
Rothstein J.A., concurring, wrote: 
I recognize that Tele-Direct . . . may be read to eliminate 
the industrious collection approach to originality that has 
sometimes been used for compilations.  I also recognize 
that debate continues over whether industrious collection or 
creativity is the better approach for determining the 
originality of compilations.  (citation omitted)  However, I 
am mindful of the words of Estey J. in Compo Co. . . . not 
to decide copyright cases on broader grounds than 
necessary.231 
The position that emerges, consistent with other views of Tele-
Direct, is that a creativity-linked test of originality may be 
discredited as matter of general application, but may still have 
currency with respect to factual compilations.232  However, the 
explicit rejection of a creativity-linked standard by the majority in 
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada as 
undesirable in principle,233 and the endorsement of an equally 
traditional view of copyright as a narrow economic right which is 
teleologically constructed as an incentive to creation rather than 
deonotologically constructed as the lynchpin of creative authorship 
by the majority of the Supreme Court in Theberge,234 leaves the 
law in a most unsatisfying state.  Clearly a compilation of fact 
 
230 Id. 
231 Id. para. 219 (citations omitted). 
232 See id.; Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, paras. 4042 (Can.) (holding 
that Tele-Direct does not have a broad effect in re-aligning Canadian copyright law 
with American law and away from British law in respect to creativity.  Justice Reed 
acknowledges then that there is some effect, but not a significant departure from the pre-
existing law.  Presumably the change is only manifested in respect to compilations of 
fact.). 
233 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
234 Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 (Can.). 
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requires something more than mere labor to be considered an 
original intellectual creation; what that quality is, however, 
remains imprecise.  It will vary in the circumstances.235 
E. Common Problems 
Copyright protects compilations in the form of collections of 
original works, of facts, and of the two combined; each must be 
original for the protection to subsist as a matter of law.  The British 
law, both before the implementation of the Database Directive and 
after its 1998 implementation in domestic law respecting computer 
programs, has used, and continues to use a sweat of the brow 
approach.236  The law is easy to describe but difficult to predict at 
the stage of identifying infringement rather than the protection 
stage; the nature and extent of the protection is very much 
dependent on the circumstances.237  The nature of the work and the 
type and extent of labor, skill or judgment brought to bear by the 
author on his or her creation informs judgments of originality as 
well as substantiality of copying to determine whether there has 
been an over-borrowing from the original compilation.238  This 
blurring of subsistence and substantiality reflects the nature of 
British copyright as a means to allied, but shifting, goals as befit 
the circumstances. 
Thus, for example, in protecting an anthology of poetry, the 
court might look to the skill of the author in selecting from 
amongst the poets accumulated works and the sympathetic 
ordering of the poems.  The anthologist fits the picture of the 
romantic author so revered in the popular conception of copyright.  
 
235 CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th 385 para. 221. 
236 See Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Universal Tutorial Press Ltd, [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 
608 (Eng.); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 
273 (Eng.); Walter v. Lane, 1900 A.C. 539 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
237 See, e.g., Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109, 116 (Eng. 
Ch.); Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd. v. Beehive Spinning, 1995 R.P.C. 683 (Eng. Ch.); 
Express Newspapers plc. v. News (U.K.) Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1320 (Eng. Ch.); 
Ladbroke (Football) [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 273; G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank 
Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Univ. Tutorial 
Press Ltd., 45 R.P.C. 335 (Eng. Ch. 1928). 
238 Cf. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty Ltd., [2002] F.C.A.F.C. 112, para. 
96 (Austl.). 
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In protecting a functional work like a coupon of football wagers, 
the court is more circumspect; considering the effort that went into 
collecting the data and presenting it accurately and suitable to a 
purpose.  It protects the former happily, and the latter grudgingly.  
Yet it does protect them both.  It does so notwithstanding that the 
dominant policy considerations are different as befits the differing 
nature of the subject matterthe two works and the justification 
for protecting each are poles apart.239 Copyrights mixed 
justifications give rise to doctrine that covers the shared concerns 
of these two rights-holders: to publish the work or withhold 
publication, to exploit the work economically in selected markets, 
to translate the work, etc.  However, it is the functional nature of 
the coupon that draws the work away from the creative and to a 
concern with competition which shades the protection differently.  
Copyright law explicitly recognizes these functional differences 
and tries to stay its hand where it regards protection as 
inappropriate. 
The American law articulates its hostility to interfering with 
free markets differently.  Various devices, sometimes bordering on 
the fictional, are employed to deny protection rather than forestall 
a finding of infringement.  The American law has done this 
through judicial construction of the idea-expression dichotomy in 
respect to copyrightability and through doctrine that seeks to 
safeguard a principled view of authorship.  The Feist test 
considered the nature of functional subject matter in the form of 
factual compilations and decreed a modicum of creativity must 
be present to achieve copyrights goals,240 and the Federal Court of 
Canada agreed (though a cloud now sits over that agreement).241  
Authorship of a factual compilation conveys a sense of creativity 
and ingenuity according to Décary J.A. in the Tele-Direct case, 
which appears as binding on the matter.242  One might take the 
view that these tests are as hard to apply in a predictable and 
 
239 William Hill (Football) Ltd. v. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd., 1980 R.P.C. 539, 555 (Eng. 
1962). 
240 See Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
241 See Tele-Direct (Publns) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info., Inc., [1996] 74 C.P.R.3d 72, 74, 
affd, [1998] 2 F.C. 22, 38 (Can. 1997). 
242 See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385, 
paras. 29, 34 (Can.). 
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certain manner as sweat of the brow, and may not be as significant 
in practice as one might anticipate after reading the judgments in 
Feist and Tele-Direct.  Consider subject matter as mundane as a 
list of used car prices.243  In CCC Information Services, Inc. v. 
Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., the issue before the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was whether a 
publication titled the Automobile Red BookOfficial Used Car 
Valuations was protected in copyright.244  The Red Book was 
published eight times a year, in different versions for each of three 
regions of the United States plus a single state, and set out values 
for each automobile make, model number, body style, and engine 
type that were included in the compilation.245  Circuit Judge Leval 
found that the compilation was an original compilation under the 
Feist test: the prices were not historical statistics but predictions 
and thus were protectable expression rather than uncopyrightable 
facts.246  That these predictions were laid out in the most logical 
ordering was insufficient to hold that the expression had merged 
with the idea or that the presentation of the material was not 
original: 
The fact that an arrangement of data responds logically to 
the needs of the market for which the compilation was 
prepared does not negate originality.  To the contrary, the 
use of logic to solve the problems of how best to present 
the information being compiled is independent creation.247 
Moreover, this was what Feist had in mind, according to Judge 
Leval: 
The thrust of the Supreme Courts ruling in Feist was not to 
erect a high barrier of originality requirement.  It was rather 
to specify, rejecting the strain of lower court rulings that 
 
243 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d 
Cir. 1994); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that maps satisfy Feist requirements for creativity in selection, coordination, and 
arrangement of information); Marshal & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952, 
96061 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that assessors tables satisfy the Feist requirements). 
244 See CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 6474. 
245 See id. at 63. 
246 See id. at 67. 
247 Id. at 67. 
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sought to base protection on the sweat of the brow, that 
some originality is essential to protection of authorship, and 
that the protection afforded extends only to those original 
elements.  Because the protection is so limited, there is no 
reason under the policies of the copyright law to demand a 
high degree of originality.248 
Similarly, in Edutile Inc. v. Automobile Protection Assn,249 the 
Federal Court of Appeal considered whether guides to the process 
of used cars and trucks were original compilations under Tele-
Direct.  These guides were published for consumers rather than car 
dealers, as was the case in CCC Information Services.250  The 
guides listed three values for each vehicle in side-by-side columns: 
trade-in, private sale, and retail values.251  It was this arrangement 
that made the compilation not only original, but brilliant and 
innovative.252  Décary J.A. reviewed some of the testimony at 
trial and found: 
I conclude from this testimony that the fact of setting out 
the Private Sale market and the Retail Value market 
side by side in columns was a brilliant, innovative 
move.  The Trial Judge could not ignore this decisive 
testimony . . . .  It is not easy in compilation situations to 
draw a line between what signifies a minimal degree of 
skill, judgment and labour and what indicates no creative 
element . . . .  A guide organized in this way is, to use this 
Courts words in Tele-Direct, at paragraph 28 [page 36], a 
work that was independently created by the author and 
which displays at least a minimal degree of skill, judgment 
and labour in its overall selection or arrangement . . . .  
Copyright accordingly subsists, resulting not from the 
three-column layout nor from the selection or designation 
as such of the three markets used by the appellant, but from 
the selection and layout of two juxtaposed columns, one 
 
248 Id. at 66. 
249 6 C.P.R. (4th) 211 (F.C.), appeal denied, [2001] 1 FC at i (Can.). 
250 See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385, 
paras. 29, 34 (Can.); CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at  67. 
251 See Edutile, 6 C.P.R.4th para. 3. 
252 See id. para. 12. 
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dealing with the Private Sale market and the other 
dealing with the Retail Value market.253 
Though this author anticipates that the language used would be less 
effusive, it is beyond doubt that a British court would also extend 
protection to each of these price guides, as would a pre-Tele-Direct 
Canadian court using a comparable standard, or an Australian court 
using a standard of substantial labor or expense incurred in the 
collection and presentation of data.254  Indeed, though couched in 
the language of creativity, the Edutile court itself looked to the 
traditional test of labor, skill or judgment, and appears merely to 
have expanded the traditional list to include creativity as a relevant 
element.255 
With respect, the reasoning in each of Edutile and CCC 
Information Services seems quite artificial and not directed to 
preserving the creativity and ingenuity inherent in any view of 
creative authorship; the judgments do make good commercial 
sense in protecting the investment of labor that went into the 
obtaining, selection, verification, and to some smaller degree, the 
arrangement of the data.  However, the judgments obscure the 
policy reasons justifying protection, construct doctrine in a manner 
that does not anticipate the need to address the same concerns 
where the data might be presented in digital form, and act in a 
traditional manner reflective of the pre-Feist jurisprudence while 
attempting to employ some augmented Feist standard.256  The 
result is that the Edutile and CCC Information Services may 
provide a pragmatic commercial balance through the construction 
and application of the originality standard in respect to factual 
compilations to a limited extent, but over-looked is the economic 
interest in continuing verification and maintenance of the contents 
of the database.257  The incentive created through the copyright is 
 
253 Id. paras. 1315. 
254 Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty Ltd., [2002] F.C.A.F.C. 112, para. 96 
(Austl.). 
255 Edutile, 6 C.P.R.4th para. 8. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
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focused on initial creation of the work, and does not address the 
equally significant issue of ongoing maintenance.258 
Beyond the uncertainty of subsistence, the treatment of such 
factual compilations is on par with any other literary work such 
that concerns respecting access to data (and the problem of overly-
strong proprietary protections curtailing access) and data 
aggregation are left to the general defenses or competition 
authorities.  Arguably, the American system is best placed to 
overcome these problems given the flexibility of the fair use 
defense, but the uncertain application of that doctrine does not 
really address the concerns raised here in any meaningful way.259 
Hence, the problem in all three jurisdictions examined is 
uncertainty and unpredictability in respect to developed doctrine.  
It is not that the doctrine yields the wrong results; the problem is 
more in respect to the difficulty in applying these tests to factual 
compilations, and particularly to routinely assembled and verified 
collections of data in electronic form.  As a result, where formal 
legal models of protection display uncertainty, informal models 
become importantcontract and technological measuresthough 
these may result in over-containment as much as more formal 
models.260  It may be that the tensions that arise in the law based 
on the functional nature of the subject matter are not capable of a 
final resolution in constructing copyright doctrine; the balance of 
interests needs continuous monitoring and occasional rebalancing 
in respect to new types of works, new uses, and new markets.  This 
is of course in addition to concerns that copyright doctrine be 
structured to further a principled model of authorship in 
constructing an entitlement that is economically, philosophically, 
and culturally justifiable.261 
Perhaps another approach altogether is warranted. 
 
258 Id. 
259 See Maureen A. ORourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In 
Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 56780, 62227 
(2001). 
260 Id. 
261 See generally Robert H. Rothstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and 
the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725 (1993) (describing the philosophical 
traditions behind the concept of authorship). 
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III. THE EU DATABASE DIRECTIVE: A TWO-TIERED APPROACH 
The Database Directive now forms part of the copyright and 
neighboring rights regime established thus far by the European 
Union in five Directives presently in force,262 and two awaiting 
implementation.263  Prior to the adoption of the Directive, differing 
approaches were taken to the core originality criterion for the 
protection of factual compilations amongst the various Member 
States of the European Union.264  The United Kingdom, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, France, Portugal, and Spain all afforded full 
protection to collections of facts in one form or another.265  
Germany and Italy required the collection to be a personal 
intellectual creation.266  Denmark used the Scandinavian 
catalogue right, which was to be a model for the database right, 
providing for a term of ten years protection.267  Only Belgium and 
Luxembourg limited protection in any real sense.268  All of this 
was alongside the differing scope of unfair competition 
protections.269  The negotiators of the Database Directive were 
tasked with a uniform approach that would afford better and more 
effective protection of databases.270 
 
262 Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3; Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. 
(L 122) 42 (legal protection of computer programs); Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 
O.J. (L 346) 61 (rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in 
the field of intellectual property); Council Directive 93/83/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15 
(coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright 
applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission); Council Directive 
93/98/EEC, 1993 (L 290) 9 (harmonization the term of protection of copyright and 
certain related rights). 
263 Council Directive 2001/84/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (resale right for the benefit of 
the author of an original work of art); Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 
10 (harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society). 
264 See generally Shireen Smith, Legal Protection of Factual Compilations and 
Databases in EnglandHow Will the Database Directive Change the Law in This Area?, 
1997 INTELL. PROP. Q. 450, 467. 





270 Id. at 46667. 
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In any regime, new or old, assumptions are made and 
uncertainties arise and it is not this authors intention to dissect the 
provisions of the Directive in detail.  The problems in the Database 
Directive are more profound and can be revealed without a highly 
technical analysis.  In general, one can conclude that the Directive 
casts a net that is too broad, too unchecked by institutional 
balancing mechanisms, and too uncertain in many of its provisions 
to be a model for others.  Some of these uncertainties and flaws 
may yet be eliminated when a database jurisprudence emerges 
from the European Court of Justice.  However, given the tendency 
for Member States to implement the Directive with what some 
might term a particular European efficiency, there has not been an 
abundance of case law yet, and the situation may remain fluid for 
some time.  One might note that some observers think the situation 
is so dire that the Directive ought to be repealed in its entirety as 
soon as possible.271  This author thinks that this is a rather drastic 
solution to a set of discrete problems, each of which may be cured 
or minimized through less radical means. 
A. The Goals Of The Directive 
Released as part of an ongoing exercise to reform the copyright 
laws of the European Union, the 1988 Green Paper on Copyright 
and the Challenge of Technology identified database protection as 
an area that should be addressed in the reform agenda,272 and by 
1991 the Commission felt that reform should be undertaken 
without delay.273  The first proposal for a directive was submitted 
on April, 15 1992.274  By this time, Feist had been decided as had 
some European decisions strongly preferring a creativity-linked 
approach to the protection of factual compilations.275  The 
 
271 See Maurer et al., Europes Database Experiment, supra note 32, at 790. 
272 See Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology: Copyright Issues 
Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 final at 207 [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
273 See Follow-up to the Green Paper, COM(90)584 final. 
274 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, 1992 O.J. (C 156) 4. 
275 See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Implementing the European Database Directive, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMAN 
COHEN JEHORAM 184, 19596, 199200 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds., 
1998). See, e.g., Van Dale Lexicografie B.V. v. Rudolf Jan Romme (holding that the 
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Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the proposal took 
account of the developments in the United States, as well as the 
WIPO and GATT/TRIPS negotiations, and stated a preference for 
some degree of protection that would arise on the basis of effort 
rather than creativity.276  Thus, protection of databases would not 
be limited in principle by that which might arise under a rigid 
regime oriented to protecting creativity-linked conceptions of 
authorship.277  The point was to construct a protection for 
databases that would be tied to their functional, rather than 
aesthetic nature, obviating the need for an artificially weak 
construction of creativity.278  Thus, from its earliest stages, the 
Directive was envisaged as one that should relate to the nature of 
the subject matter and the economic interest in protection, but the 
form of the protection was still firmly tied to a proprietary 
approach.279 
By 1993, in the Amended Proposal280 released after the process 
of initial consultation and revision, there was interest in a 
supplementary sui generis database right to copyright protection
a right that would be a non-proprietary and that could be modeled 
on the 10-year catalogue right in the Scandinavian countries.281  
The Amended Proposal was amended and re-amended as it made 
its way through the various institutions in the European legislative 
process, and became the final version of the Database Directive 
when adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers in 1996.282  As agreed in final form, the Directive creates 
 
creativity testthe authors personal viewhad been met in organizing a dictionary of 
the Dutch language), affd, 1994 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [NJ] 58 (Ct. App.). 
276 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(92)24 final at 3638, paras. 6.1.2.1. 
277 Id. at 25. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 2631. 
280 Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
1993 O.J. (C 308) 1 [hereinafter Amended Proposal]. 
281 Gunnar W.G. Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT 
67 (Egbert J. Dommering & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 1991) (pointing out that the 
copyright acts of all five Nordic countriesDenmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Swedencontain provisions expressly protecting non-original compilations of data, such 
as catalogues, tables and similar compilations, provided they comprise a large number 
of items). 
282 Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3. 
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a two-tiered approach to database protection: copyright protection 
on the basis of a creativity-linked test of originality with a term of 
the life of the author plus seventy years, and, the new sui generis 
database right with a term of fifteen years.283  Made explicit in the 
negotiations and final form of the Directive was the restriction that 
data is not to be the subject of independent protection in providing 
protection to the database in which it is arranged and presented.284 
B. Copyright Under the Directive 
Under the terms of the Directive, copyright protection only 
subsists in those databases which by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents, constitute the authors own 
intellectual creation.285  No other criteria are to be applied to 
determine their eligibility for that protection,286 and the test will 
not admit of aesthetic or qualitative criteria.287  Professor 
Hugenholtz describes the final version of the originality test as 
reflective of the tortuous state of the negotiations: [i]t is a typical 
European compromise, higher than the British requirement of skill 
and labour, but lower than the test of Überdurchschnittlichkeit 
[clear originality].288 
In the EU, Member States with droit dauteur systems typically 
use variations on a creativity standard that is equal to, and 
sometimes higher than, the Feist test.289  In such droit dauteur 
systems, originality goes far beyond constructing a higher 
threshold of protection as a gate-keeping device to limit the 
protection of utilitarian subject-matter; it speaks to a different 
philosophical approach to the issues which is predicated on the 
protection of the personality of the author as captured in his or her 
 
283 See id. art. 10; Council Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 262, art. 1. 
284 Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, para. 45. 
285 Id. art. 3. 
286 Id. art. 3(1). 
287 See id. para. 16. 
288 Hugenholtz, supra note 275, at 187. See Inkassoprogramm, Bundesgeritchtshofes in 
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 94, 276 (285) (F.R.G.); GUY TRITTON, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 213 (1996). 
289 See Neeta Thakur, Database Protection in the European Union and the United 
States: The European Database Directive as an Optimum Global Model?, 2001 INTELL. 
PROP. Q. 100, 109. 
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creation.290  In any case, implementation of this aspect of the 
Directive in such civilian jurisdictions is relatively straightforward; 
their existing approaches to originality are already compliant, save 
where exceptional protections exist.291  There have been 
suggestions that those standards are too high and will have to be 
revised downwards to ensure compliance, but that has not yet been 
addressed in implementing legislation or in jurisprudence.292 
For the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, more 
serious attention to compliance has been required. 293  While the 
term intellectual creation is based on the Berne Convention 
standard,294 and the term the authors own intellectual creation is 
the same as that used in the Software Directive,295 the position 
adopted by the United Kingdom is that what is intended in the 
Database Directive is a higher test of originality with application 
only to databases.296  This would mean that United Kingdom 
copyright law (aside from databases) would still be regarded as 
generally compliant with the Berne Conventions use of the same 
standard, which itself has not seriously been doubted in the past.  
This position is bolstered by the Explanatory Memorandum, which 
explains that the originality test should not be the same for 
 
290 Id.; see also Gary Lea, In Deference of Originality, 7 ENT. L. REV. 21 (1996) 
(discussing that some see the differences as exaggerated, specifically in respect to 
functional matter). 
291 But see Thakur, supra note 289, at 113. 
292 See Hugenholtz, supra note 275, at 187 (According to Gaster, the Commission 
official who was directly involved with the drafting of the Directive, all continental 
European Member States would have to lower the existing requirement of originality in 
respect to databases: Politically speaking the common law Member States will have to 
lift the bar for application of copyright protection, whereas the continental civil law 
countries will have to lower it.  This bridging the gap between copyright and droit 
dauteur is certainly not de minimis. (quoting Jens L. Gaster, The EU Council of 
Ministers Common Position Concerning the Legal Protection of Databases: A First 
Comment, 17 ENT. L. REV. 258, 260 (1995)). 
293 The Netherlands has been unique in allowing a pseudo-copyright to attach to non
original expression. See Tobias Cohen Jehoram, Copyright in Non-Original Writings: 
PastPresentFuture?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM 103, 105 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom 
eds., 1998). 
294 See Berne, supra note 62, art. 2(1). 
295 Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 262, art. 1(3). 
296 See SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 80, at 95 n.81. 
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databases as for literary works in general.297  Moreover, it seems 
perfectly sensible and consistent with the general assumption in the 
negotiations that the two-tiered approach adopted by the EU would 
be one that retains copyright in compliance with international 
obligations and national laws, but relegates it to a smaller role in 
the revised regime.  In any case, the lack of objection from the 
Commission to the use of the higher standard elsewhere in the 
United Kingdom copyright regime and specifically in respect to 
computer programs seems to indicate its acquiescence to the 
British approach. 
Thus, it would seem that Directive has been successful in 
cutting down the broad application of copyright based on a more 
refined model of authorship, consistent with the approaches 
favored in civilian jurisdiction, the United States, and Canada. 
C. The Database Right 
The database right is the core and most important aspect of the 
Database Directive.298  It is a non-proprietary protection that is 
independent of any copyright or other intellectual property right 
that may exist in the database, or in any of the individual pieces of 
data or information collected together within the database.299  
Article 7(1) of the Directive provides: 
Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a 
database which shows that there has been qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the 
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to 
prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a 
substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, of the contents of that database.300 
The database right evolved significantly during the legislative 
process.301  The initial interest in protecting such subject-matter 
was the recognition that existing protections were inadequate given 
 
297 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 276, paras. 3.2.5.6. 
298 See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art. 7. 
299 See id. art. 7(4). 
300 Id. art. 7(1). 
301 See Hugenholtz, supra note 275, at 185. 
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the ease by which digital databases could be copiedthe 
traditional concern that the subject-matter at issue was expensive 
to compile and maintain, but was easy to misappropriate.302  This 
naturally led to a rationale for protection predicated upon the same 
range of unfair competition principles that are present in common 
law copyright approaches.303  In this sense, the initial orientation of 
the Directive fit both the immediate copyright reform agenda, and, 
the on-again, off-again interest in harmonizing unfair competition 
protections.304 
There are three main problems with the database right: the 
absence of a strong link between the provisions as expressed and 
the justification for the protection, the protections as expressed are 
themselves overly-broad, and, there is uncertainty as to the level of 
investment required to attract or maintain database right.  In the 
first proposal for the Database Directive, the right of the maker of 
the database was against unfair extraction and/or utilization, in 
commercial circumstances.305  This was changed on the reasoning 
that fairness of extraction or utilization was a more difficult matter 
to judge than unauthorized extraction or reutilization.306  Yet even 
the word unauthorized was eliminated from the later Amended 
Proposal while the infringing acts retained as then drafted.307  The 
 
302 See Green Paper, supra note 272, paras. 6.4.7.10, .6.2. 
303 See Xuqiong (Joanna) Wu, Foreign and International Law: Database Protection 
E.C. Database Directive, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 575 (2002). 
304 See generally Frauke Henning-Bodewig & Gerhard Schricker, New Initiatives For 
The Harmonisation Of Unfair Competition Law In Europe 24 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 271 (2002); Gerhard Schricker, Twenty Five Years of Protection Against Unfair 
Competition, INTL REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [IIC] 782 (1995) (providing an 
update on statute of efforts to harmonize unfair competition law); Friedrick-Karl Beier, 
The Law of Unfair Competition in the European Community, Its Development and 
Present Status, 16 IIC 139 (1985) (discussing historic development of unfair competition 
law in Europe); Eugen Ulmer, Unfair Competition Law in the European Economic 
Community, 4 IIC 188 (1973) (discussing harmonization of unfair competition laws). 
305 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 276, art. 2(5) (Member States shall provide 
for a right for the maker of a database to prevent the unauthorized extraction or 
reutilization, from that database, of its contents, in whole or in substantial part, for 
commercial purposes.). 
306 Debra B. Rosler, The European Unions Proposed Directive for the Legal Protection 
of Databases: A New Threat to the Free Flow of Information, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 
11516 (1995). 
307 Compare Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 276, art. 2(5), with Amended 
Proposal, supra note 280, at 10(1), and Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art. 
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unfortunate result is that while the Directive is concerned with 
misappropriation of the investment in the creation and maintenance 
of databases, the Directive lacks a unifying principle to guide 
doctrinal development of extraction and re-utilization within 
its text.  This seems particularly unfortunate as the break in the link 
between protection and justification denudes the Directive of the 
conceptual certainty that plagues the problematic application of 
differing models of copyright law to functional subject matter.  
Indeed, this move away from a directed protection against 
misappropriation of investment by rivals and commercial actors to 
a protection of investment308 generally is a central weakness. 
The protections themselves become susceptible to overly broad 
application absent a limiting principle.  For example, extraction as 
a singular basis for infringement leads to some surprising results
a hacker who accesses a database without a license, looks at the 
data, and memorizes it may well be guilty of extraction according 
to one judge,309 as well as a deep-linker who seeks to aggregate 
information from disparate sources.310  These seem outside the 
justification for the right and intellectual property protections 
generally.  Similarly, re-utilization alone would seem to cover a 
myriad of uses in respect to the Internet.  The provisions in the 
Directive lack specificity in these contexts, and one might expect 
that the Directive will have to be interpreted narrowly to avoid 
these implications. 
Similarly, little guidance is given as to what constitutes a 
substantial part 311 of the database for the purposes of judging 
infringement.  This adds little to remedying the problem of 
differential national application of copyright norms, where a 
purposive approach renders the question intimately involved with 
questions of originality.  Clearly, it is the database that is protected 
rather than the data, so that one might expect that the same sort of 
 
7(1).  Yet Recital 6 of the Directive still lists as justification the absence of a generalized 
law of unfair competition to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of 
the contents of a database.  Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, para. 6. 
308 Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, para. 42. 
309 British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd, 2001 R.P.C. 31, para. 57., 
revd in part, 2001 E.W.C.A. Civ. 1268 (Eng.). 
310 See Hugenholtz, supra note 275. 
311 Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art. 7(2). 
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trap that the Australian High Court fell into respecting the value of 
every individual item in a computer program will not be 
repeated.312  This was the position accepted by Justice Laddie in 
the recent William Hill case in the United Kingdom, presently 
before the European Court of Justice.313  However, what 
database-ness consists of seems elusive at present, which is 
troubling given the breadth of the protections created by the 
Directive. 
D. Defenses and Permissions 
The problems associated with a wide-ranging database right are 
compounded by the inadequate range of defenses and exceptions 
included within the provisions of the Directive.314  This is most 
unfortunate given the early recognition in the negotiating process 
that protections recognized ought to be balanced against suitable 
 
312 Autodesk Inc. v. Dyason, [1992] R.P.C. 575 (Austl.); contra Howard P. Knopf, The 
Database Dilemma in Canada: Is Ultra Copyright Required?, 48 U. NEW BRUNSWICK 
L.J. 163, 172 (1999) (regarding the draft WIPO Database Treaty). 
313 See William Hill, 2001 R.P.C. para. 47.  In the William Hill case, BHB (the 
governing body for British horseracing) developed and maintained a large database of 
horses, owners, racing colors, trainers, jockeys and other information (most if not all 
available in the public domain).  William Hill, in facts reminiscent of Intl News Serv. v. 
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), obtained data from a subscriber to BHBs 
database and used it to operate its Internet gambling service.  The data obtained was 
presented in a new format (with only the details of the meeting, race, list of horses 
running, and time of the race being re-utilized) but was not a substantial quantity of all 
the data available in BHBs database.  It was held that this breached database right.  
Justice Laddie canvassed the Database Directive and its U.K. implementation and held 
that facts fell within the contemplation of the drafters in creating the new sui generis 
right.  On appeal, 2001 E.W.C.A. Civ. 1268, the argument made was that Justice Laddie 
had interpreted the Directive over broadly and that there was a mix of inconsistent 
European authority.  While inclined to dismiss the appeal, the Court of Appeal referred 
the matter to the ECJ:  
whether infringement of database right requires that there be a copying of the 
systematic arrangement of data as presented in the original database; whether 
extraction or re-utilization must be from the original directly, and whether 
obtaining from a licensee is outside the scope of the protection; and whether a 
dynamic database is a series of databases with separate rights, rather than one 
database whose contents are protected on different terms. 
Id. 
314 See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art. 12 (providing that Member States 
shall provide appropriate remedies in respect to infringements of the rights provided for 
in this Directive.). 
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permissions to enable appropriate access to data.  Though there is 
scope for national action by Member States,315 the sole mandatory 
general user permission is a narrow one.316  Article 8(1) provides: 
The maker of a database which is made available to the 
public in whatever manner may not prevent a lawful user of 
the database from extracting and/or re-utilizing 
insubstantial parts of its contents, evaluated qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively, for any purposes whatsoever.  Where 
the lawful user is authorized to extract and/or re-utilize 
only part of the database, this paragraph shall apply only to 
that part.317 
The provision goes on, in article 8(2), to disallow the lawful user 
performing acts which conflict with normal exploitation of the 
database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
maker of the database.318  These limiting provisions bear 
resemblance to the Berne, article 9(2), which allows for national 
defenses provided that such reproduction does not conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of another.319  Article 9(1) was 
added to the Berne in the Stockholm Revision (1967) to ensure that 
the right of reproduction would be a minimum protection in all 
Berne Union countries, notwithstanding that its existence under 
Berne had been assumed.320  Article 9(2) limits the right so as to 
allow countries to create exceptions, and should be construed 
narrowly so as not to interfere with the normal rights of 
exploitation associated with the copyright work.321  The provisions 
were drafted by a special working party that was struck to address 
concerns respecting reprography (private copying in large 
numbers) and home taping of sound recordings and films broadcast 
 
315 See id. art. 12 (preserving defenses existing in law in respect to copyright); id. art. 9 
(allowing Member States to create exceptions for private use, teaching or scientific 
research, and public security or an administrative or judicial procedure). 
316 See id. art. 8(1). 
317 Id. 
318 Id. art. 8(2). 
319 Berne, supra note 62, art. 9(2); see also TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 13. 
320 See RICKETSON, supra note 66, at 120. 
321 See Berne, supra note 62, art. 9(2); NORDEMANN ET AL., supra note 66, at 10708. 
2-FREEDMAN FORMAT 12/12/02 1:03 PM 
2002] SHOULD CANADA ENACT A NEW DATABASE RIGHT? 97 
on television.322  The Report of the Stockholm Conference makes 
clear that national jurisdictions can create exceptions for special 
circumstances such as private use and for teaching and research, 
but that the reproduction right must be respected in respect to its 
normal exploitation. 323 
This paucity of meaningful and compulsory defenses becomes 
more serious given the lack of mandatory licensing provisions 
within the Directive itself in respect to single-source data.  The 
Directive contemplates that the refusal to license at all or on fair 
terms will allow for intervention,324 as was the case in Magill, 
where the Commission was able to prevent the secondary market 
in television listings from being dominated unfairly by the data 
provider on the assumption that copyright existed in the program 
listings.325  However, whether the failure to exercise the right to 
license the data according to the sui generis database right is the 
exercise of an intellectual property right326 is uncertain, and, 
more seriously, it may be possible for the database holder to mount 
the defense that as the right doesnt attach to data and the data is 
presumably available elsewhere in an unprocessed or unpublished 
form, there is no scope for dominance according to Magill.327 
The result is that the broad scope of the right is not balanced 
against meaningful defenses or permissions, and that the wide 
allowance for the development of defenses within particular 
jurisdictions undercuts the goal of harmonized treatment.  The 
further result is that the sui generis database right has emerged as 
property-like protection without the institutional devices available 
in other intellectual property areas to provide market or public 
interest-based balance.  In this way, the desire to provide an 
adequate level of protection while avoiding the prospect of over-
containment through a proprietary model has led to just thata 
wide right without adequate balancing mechanisms. 
 
322 See NORDEMANN ET AL., supra note 66, at 33. 
323 Report of the Rapporteur Général (Svante Bergström), para. 85, translated in 
STEPHEN M. STEWART & HAMISH SANDISON, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 122 (1989). 
324 See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, at para. 47. 
325 Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commn of the European Cmtys., [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 18. 
326 See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, paras. 17, 18. 
327 See id. 
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CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD IN REFORM 
The legal issues raised in respect to the protection of factual 
compilations are not new, but the business and legal environment 
is different today than in the past and may favor substantially 
revised legal models as a consequence.  That environment is no 
longer a strictly national one, and, looking to the copyright revision 
exercise, it should be borne in mind that the best solutions are 
those that further the international interest in harmonization of 
laws.  For the law of copyright, this means that functional 
expression should be treated for the utilitarian subject matter that it 
is, with less emphasis on the protection of artificial authorial 
creativity and with more emphasis on the protection of investment 
against misappropriation.  The reality is that Canadian law does 
protect factual compilations at present, where the originality test 
can be satisfied to allow copyright to subsist in such material.328  
Like the United States and the United Kingdom, it does so 
hesitantly, with difficulty, and through uncertain doctrine prone to 
misapplication.329  The result is that legal protection is unclear (and 
thus the costs of determining and enforcing rights increase, with 
those costs passed to users), with the likely result that informal 
protections (contract, the use of technology) are employed by 
rational business people seeking to safeguard their investment.  
These informal models of protection should be of as much concern 
to those weighing the balance between protection and access 
interests as formalized proprietary models.  Moreover, this 
approach fails to address the public interest concerns associated 
with specific uses of data (leaving them for the general defenses 
that are made available in respect to all original literary works), 
fails to address the economics of databases meaningfully 
(specifically the interest in promoting an optimal degree of 
maintenance), and leaves the problem of data aggregation for 
competition authorities (not intrinsically bad, but a complication 
that could be resolved better internally). 
 
328 See Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 
(Can.); CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385, 
paras. 29, 34 (Can.); Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, paras. 4042 (Can.). 
329 See supra Parts III.BC. 
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Looking across jurisdictions and concluding that these 
problems are common to them, it is also apparent that copyright 
law seeks to protect factual compilations on a blending of various 
justifications but primarily on the basis of a generalized concept of 
unfair competition.  Protecting such an interest traditionally poses 
problems for the law, and protection of a variety of forms of 
intellectual property through a direct tort on that basis has been 
avoided in the past on principle.  Simply put, the cure of a roving 
tort not subject to internal balancing mechanisms in respect to 
valuable intangibles is felt to be worse than the disease of 
misappropriation of investment by trade rivals.  Thus copyright has 
sufficed in protection of factual compilations, but uneasily. 
If copyright is to continue in this area, as it must pending 
revision of international agreements at the very least, perhaps it is 
not wrong that it does so on the basis of the protection of a 
principled model of authorship.  This leads to the desirable 
consequence of leaving purely utilitarian collections completely 
outside proprietary regimes and including only the very few 
collections that can meet a stricter test within the copyright system.  
Thus, the anthologist who meets a higher creativity-linked test is 
truly an author deserving of not only the right to exploit his or her 
work, but also of those non-economic moral rights which 
accompany copyright protection.  The corporate maker of a 
database that is continuously updated through the use of automated 
technology is not regarded as being similarly situated. 
Less-worthy (unoriginal) databases are still worthy of some 
form of protection; protection that will provide an economic 
incentive to create and make widely available the comprehensive 
and verifiably accurate sets of pure data that are so important 
today.  Thus, it may be that a two-tiered approach is most 
appropriatecopyright protection based on a higher standard, and, 
a new sui generis right to protect factual compilations (whether in 
digital or conventional form) that is directed at the protection of 
the substantial investment made in the selection, arrangement, 
presentation, or verification of the contents of the database.  This 
answers the need unmet by copyright at present, the provision of 
an incentive to maintain the database on an ongoing basis.  
Provided that the term of the right and the test for subsistence are 
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set appropriately, such a database right would be a positive 
contribution to the copyright reform exercise.  Indeed, such a 
revised two-tiered regime may not only be a suitable way forward 
for Canada, but a revised Canadian regime along these lines would 
also be useful in setting the agenda for a second attempt at a 
database treaty under the auspices of WIPO. 
The European experience in this regard is instructive.330  What 
began as a directed vehicle for database protection that balanced 
competing interests became an unfocussed and asymmetric 
regime.331  It is a good idea gone wrong.  What is required in a 
revised Canadian model is far greater certainty in specifying the 
justification for protection, the level of investment required to 
attract and maintain protection, and the term of the right.  These 
are primarily economic matters and the empirical studies by 
leading international economists should be of great help in 
constructing a better system along the same broad lines as created 
in the Database Directive.  Rather than obscured and artificial 
reasoning tied to either authorial creativity alone or as an element 
of a general test of labor, skill or judgment, revised models 
should feature transparent economic criteria capable of more 
certain application.  At the same time, it would be very useful to 
include provisions within the statutory framework to deal with the 
problem of data aggregation directly, rather than leaving the matter 
to competition law at large.  This is also an area in which studies 
respecting the economics of databases would be of great 
assistance.  This author wishes to detail the optimal term of 
protection and the level of investment required, but doing so would 
make heroic assumptions about the ability of legal academics to 
draw accurate economic conclusions. 
Moreover, this author suggests that it is important to recognize 
that lawyers and judges are not economists, and neither is the 
singular goal of intellectual property law to create an optimally 
efficient market in intellectual property.  As economic efficiency is 
to economists, so too is the rule of law to lawyersan imprecise 
ideal that gathers together concepts of equality, fairness, human 
 
330 See supra Part IV. 
331 See id. 
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rights, and principled regulation.  Thus, a meaningful mechanism 
for balancing competing interests is crucial.  Ultimately, the 
question of public interest uses is a matter of policy rather than law 
and resolution is bound up with prevailing conceptions of legal 
culture.  Thus, whether a given system prefers these decisions to be 
made by trial courts under the auspices of a quasi-equitable fair use 
defense (with the implicit requirement that litigation, if not 
encouraged, is at least not discouraged through the costs rules)332 
or by the legislature which takes upon itself the task of enacting 
narrow provisions as required from time to time (as has been more 
of the tradition in Canada and the United Kingdom), it matters less 
for the narrow purposes of intellectual property protection what 
method is chosen but that the process establishes itself as a 
meaningful vehicle to weigh competing interests and re-balance 
the scale to accommodate changing new or changing 
circumstances.  Thus, it is both unnecessary and undesirable to 
create a series of public-interest based permissions in the abstract 
and much more desirable to leave such matters where they belong, 
with Parliament.  With regret to those favoring complete models, 
no more specific proposition is possible given it is the use of the 
subject matter that is at issue, not its character. 
 
332 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
